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INTRODUCIION

Legal scholars g<"JWrally assume that law should st ri,·e towards
'
coherence. The ideal of coherence is regarded as partintlarly important in
Lhe comext of criminal sanctions, where it is argued that "[d]isparity [in
semencing] is a manifest form of injustice, which may bring a entencing
2
This ideal has had many consequences,

system into public disrepute."

ranging from the drafting of the U.S. sentencing guidelin<"s in the

1970

tO

Lhe current effon Lo limirjur-y discretion over punitive damage� in ton law
(which is gaining momentum both among scholars and in rhe courts) .:1
This Article invesLigates coherence within an efficit-Jlc:'

framework.

Using insights from behavioral economics and a simple experiment, we
conclude that predictabiliry in punishment may be inefficient. In keeping

with Bentham ·s principle of frugality-the principle that a sanction should
be as small as necessary w achieve

its goals-we argut- that uncertain

anctions may be preferable on efficiency grounds because: they achieve
more deterrence than certain sancLions of the same exp<>Ct<"d \alue. As we
acknowledge, this argumem is w
t o-edged. On the one hancl, it suggests rhat
there may be substantial benefits to uncertainry in sanctioning. On the other
hand, the serious objections to uncertainty in sanctioning-o�jenions which
we acknowledge and explore-also suggest important limits on efficiency as
a guide in designing legal wks governing deterrence.
Traditionally und<"rstood, legislaLOrs and policy maJ...er� ha'<' rwo ways to
increase' the deterrence of \vrongful activity:

increasing the siztJ of the

sancrion imposed or increasing the probability of deLeCLion. In combination.
these nvo variables constitut<' rhe expected sanction. and tht' expened
�
sannion i what determines the rate of crime or wrongful beha,·ior. Some
law ancl economics �cholars have pointed out the rek\'anrc of

a

third

effcn of a

,·ariable, attitudes wward risk, explaining that the cleterrent

sanction depends on the subjective value of the sanction ro the individual in
'
question. ' This subjccti,·e value depends nor only on rJ1e si7e and probabiliry

I.
(�00�).
2.

,\,,,, Cass R. Sunstrlll c:t al.. J>H'dlrtab�,

lnrolu•rt nt.Jud1f11111/ts. !'l.J

.\1'1• Alldrt"w Asltw<>1th, Four ·/ninuqru·�

fin

Rl'lftiiiiiJ!:

S 1.". 1.. R�.\. I I !i;{. I I :>4

.\1"11/l'llft' I>Hjmrtl_).

111 PRt:-..t.ll'l.l·.n

<;1:.1\"1 �.:"WI:-\t.: RL-\[JI:-\(:� 0'-. ·IIIHlRY :\:--Jll Pouc:y '227. 'l.:�ti (An d n·,,· \'qn HtrM h & .A.ndrt"\\
As]l\,·onh t>ds., Jq�9).

�-

.\rr Stall"" F<•rm �1ut. Aut<>. In�.

Cu.,..

< :amplwll. 5:1x l .�. 40� ('21111:-'.)

1

••'H'NII).( :.�ward

of punitive d;uaagc.s undt'J the Due l'mn·s� t:lause ot llw FouJl<'t"nth Atnc·JJdnwnt) . .\t•t•!(t•nt•rti/1.'
.
C.\S') R. SL "!-o'll,JN �-,AI... Pl 'ITI\ 1·. D·\\1.·\(,J-.' !2001).

-1.

Thi� is the oh�crvatt<�l\ of C.try Bt'ck.-t in his ''·min.-� I

1'11111\ltmt•lll. 1\nJ:nmuu/11

�,.

tlf1/ll•lllrh, 71i J.

1'01

.\1'1' :\. !'vlitchell Pohnsk\ & Steq·n Sh.t,·<-11. 'Jiw

Mll.l,rnitutl•• nf l·illl''· fi9 A�l. Ft.O,_

Rl·\

ttdt", < ;:n' S. lk< kt'J. C.r71111' 1111tf

Ojlllmnl Frrulmff /Jt-1,,.,." th. l'mlmlnitt_y tmd

XXII. XXO-i{l ( 1!17'1)

•·il-k .-�� 1\'1•11. b111 in lt"'iS ckt..td.. .'il't·lkc kt-1.

;u

1-.1.01>.. Hi�. 177 ( I!J6X).

wjnn ll<llr ·1. a1

17X

fk.-1-t•t < nn�i<kn·cl .utiturlt"' l<l\\�1rrl
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-lAG

l�OO·ll

of a c.;anni(lll. but also on an individual'c.; <.t\'('r:->ion to ri ·k and discount rat(·
'
(i.e .. the relative> value assigned to initial and subsequent sanction units).'
vVe extend this attention to risk aversion by incorporating insightc.; from

behavioral analysi

rt'garding the effect of uncertainty in decision-making.

We learn from and extend the re ults obtained in research on taxpayer
compliance

7

to begin to develop a more general understanding of the role

of unc<->nainry in deten;ng violations of legal norms.
Pan

fl

of

this

Article

reports

the

results

of

a

decision-making

experiment that explored how uncertain tv regarding the size of a tine and
uncertainty regarding the probability of detection affect the choice to violate
a norm. ln the experiment, participants were asked to decide whether to
take an anion that would result in a monetary payoff but would expose Lhem
to a risk of being caught and required w pay a fine. The participant-; were
given real money and assessed real fines, in amounts that varied according
w their derisions. Over the course of the experiment, we varied the cenainty

of the information provided to the panicipants about the size of the fine
and the chances of being caught, while holcting constant the expected value
of the- s,tncrion and the average probability of being caught. In general, the
greater tht" uncertaincy regat·ding the size of the fine or the chance of being
caughL the more unlikely participants were to take the action. This result is
ttot an ob,·ious one. Indeed, one of us predicted on the basis of existing
literawre on uncenaimy that individuals would prefer uncertain sanctions

to ccnain sanctions.� Hence, after describing these results, Pan [f reconciles
these rt>�ults with prior behavioral decision research.
While certainly preliminary and explorawry. the experiment advanced
the \'erY limited prior behavioral decision research on compliance with
norms in l\vo ways: by framing the decision in a manner that allows the
results 10 be generalized w a wider array of situations and by using monetary
rewards and punishments to make the decision more realistic. Although any
conclu:-;ions drawn from this research must be quite tentative, the t·e·ults

ti.

·'"'' Polinsky & Shavell, suprn note 5. at Kt\0-H I: IN' aLsn A. Mitchell Polin sky &
011 tlu• Dtsulllity a n d Oitcounting of lmprisonmPI/l and the Them)' of Detrnn1CI', 2R .J.
I . 1- I:� ( 1 999) .

Shan- 1 1.

STL 11.

Sten�n

LEGAl.

11rymul Oeterrmrr RPitm•ioml [)('(iH/JII T/tPOI)'
flf') flllfl DPLm'l'llrPj: JeiT T.
Ca'-t'\ .'\: lohn T. Schol1., Boundary EJjPctt of \'rtguP Rtsk lnjimmtlion m1 Taxpayer Dl'riswns. ;,()
ORe\' 11. \ f!O'\AI. 13EH:\\. & 1-1 L':-1. DECISIOI' PRo<.t:.SSES 360 ( 1991) I hereinafler Roundrm
1-:jft•tt.tl. ·''''' (l/.1n Dipanker Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Stntrt.url' of Unrrrtainty and Duiston Mak111g: :\n
J·.xfll'tllltr•ttal lm•£•rtigation, 24 DECISION Set. 789. 790 (l\>93): Machael 'vV. Spicer &: J Everett
J'lwm,L�. -\ wit t J->mbabilitil'5 and the Tax };umwn Uwmcm: rln E...-prrimentttl Af>IJrondt. 2 J. Eco'l.

7.

'in• g••,wmllyje!T T. Casey &John T. 'clwlz.

awl I II\ ( :nmplin.llrl'.

25 L-\\\' &:

Soc·y REV.

2 1 ( 19�J 1 ) (hereinafter

PSY<.tl<ll.. :i·�l. 243-44 ( 1 982).
�

1111

\'p,. :\lon Harcl &: U7.i Segal.

Cmninal Law mul 81'/tavinmll.aw and Ernnomict: Obst>runtifllll

lfu• '''J!fl'r/NI Roll' of Uncatailll)' in 01'tming

Crimt•, 1-2 A:-.t. L.

(cla-LII,�III� criminals' preference for an uncertain -;entence).

EC:Oi'-'. RE\'.

276,

l!80 ( 1 999)

THE VIRTUES OF UNCF.R1AJNTY IN LAW

447

suggest that uncertainly with regard to either the size of the sanction or the
probability of detection i ncrcases deterrence, ceteris pmibus.
With regard w ct-iminal law, research of this sort may provide a reason
to question the deterrent ,·alue of detet·minate sentencing. With regard to
tort law, such research suggests for example that ton reform efforts aimed at
making

non-economic

and

pun1uve

damages

more

predictable

may

decrease the deterrent effect of tort law (even if the average size of the
damages was to remain constant). l n both fields, this research suggests that
policymakers may be able 10 increase deterrence by manipulating the
uncenainty regarding probabilicy of detection. Examples or policies directed
at uncertainty in detection include publicizing short-term, intensive, random
swps for drunk driving, random audits for securities fraud, or pet-iodic,
intensive review of parient records for medical malpraC(ice. As we will
explain, it is this finding regarding the deterrence value of uncertainty with
respect to the probabilit)' of detection that is most inconsistent with
traditional

expected

utility

analysis

(and,

thus,

demonstrates
''
persuasively the "value added" of a behavioral approach).

most

Part 111 of this Anicl<" explores the treatment of uncenainty in criminal
and tort law. We begin by pointing out that the legal system does not
consistently pursue predictability in sanctioning. Consider the following two
hypothetical

situatiolls.

In

the

first

situation,

two

individuals

commit

identical wrongs and both are caught. The first is assessed a fiJ1e or damages
of $10.000, while the second is assessed a fine or damages of $5000. If the
disparity between rh<! e two individuals is due only to chance (for example, a
were caught), w ir

sentencing lottery conducted after the two criminal

provides cause for concern. The person who received the harsher sanction
has a legitimate moral, and perhaps even legal, complaint: "\Nhy was 1
11
punished more harshly than she \vas?"
Jn the seco11d

illlation, t'''O individuals commit identical wrongs but

face different probabilities of detection. The difference in the probability of
detection follows from a policy, endorsed by police officers, of thoroughly
investigating

50%

of

the'

reported

oimes

(chosen

randomly),

while

conducting only a curson· investigation of the other haJf. As a result of this
"detecrion lottery." the fir t individual has a

9

10%

chance of being caught

Sn' injlnlext acromp;1min):i notes 59-61.

lonen• is botTo\\·ed !rom Dand 1.<:'\,'t�. Th1· Punilhlll£'111 Thra
Cltwtrl'. IX PI Ill. 8.: Pl·B. AFF. 53. 58-62 ( 1 989).
I 1. In l9R2. a j ncl ge- in :--it''' York \.itv Oipped a com tO deLennitw \d1t'ther to st·ntence an
individual to tl,·cnl� 01 thirn d,tv' in jail. The public was outraged, a n d lht· judge ''-a� censured.
E.R. Shipp. Fmsl Is Brnn'tl jmm I:11Pr Bnng Srw J'ork jwigP, !'i.Y. Tl�t F.S Ap1. I. 19R:�. at B3 S1'1'
judith Resnick. PrPthuiing.-'lpfmt!l. 70 CoR-.:ELL L. Rl::\·. 603,611,615 (19�5) (discussing Lhe Ne,,·
W.

Th(· idea of a �enrennng

Lt•twe� .\tnn,,tftlllf;to

.

York mcirk•nt ;md de�cnbu1g coin flipping as an i neiTenive tool fmjndtc..tal <ieciston making) .
Thtluck

;ln·r�•on
tn c

Altt'fii/Jl'

to S<'tHenring

nm11t:1l

l<t\\·

pan of a brnadc->r phenomenon. name-ly the- a1·er�ion w
h:li1:1r 8.: Alon Hart'l. ·n11 J·;lfmnmj,·, o{ thl' l.m•• tl{ Cmninn/

lniiCrtt'S is

.\1•r Omn l><'n

·I 1'1111111 r:,,ll/m•d P!'njlnrn'''·

I·F> l' P.\
· .

1.. RF\' 1!19. :��n

n ..J\1 1 1\l�ll;l.

H9 /OH:-1 /.,I \I' NF\'/t•;\1'

-14H

r2o(H 1

and punished while rile o.;c:>cond has only a:)'}(, dta••<-c. Our inruirio11 i� that

the dis parit�· i11 the likelihood of detection

bet\\'ecn the�

two

cri n 1 ina l<; does

not raise the scune ITlOral resemment as rhe> dispari£\ in the size or the
.
sanction. fhe moral cnnct'rn of the person \dw <Lsks. . \1\'h�· me?'' St-'ems
compelling in the case of a sentencing loll<"•"· bllr not in the ca�e of a
detection

Iotter)··':!

A

number

of

well-esrahlishecl legal doctrines and

institutional practices in hoth t he criminal and tort fields ref1ect these
1
differences in moral intuition. :1
After describing some of these docu·ine. and practice , Pan III goes on
LO

explore how cri m inal law and tort law treat uncenainty. as well as ways in

which

uncertainty can be manipulated-withcHlt \·iolating foundational

doctrinal

principles-even

in

contexts

in

\vhich

it

is

(X'I'Ceived

as

undesirable. Examples of doctrines and institutional practices that create
uncertainty ir1 the criminal law field include prosecuto•ia l dio.;cretion tO
charge crimes up or down, sanctions t h a t vary accurcling to the results of the
crime, and the Pinknton rule (pursuant to which members of conspiracies

are liable for· the acts or others). Examples in the torr law field include the

practice of seuing damages according to the harm to the victim,

the

"randomizing'' effect of relying on p rivate panics to enforce the law, and the
ability of liability insurance to reduce or magnirv the u nce rtain ty in ton
sanction·. These example

are in addition to t he \·e•-y substantial eli ·cretion

granted to criminal and civil enfo•-cerncrn bodie-s regarding the allocation of
resources to the detection and prosecution of criminal and civil wrongs.
Part

IV of

this Article addresses a number of important potential

objections to manipulating uncertainr:y w optimize cteterrence. We examine
objections based on mo•-ality, cost, effectiveness, and the potential risks of
over- and under-deterrence, in addition ro o�jcnious based on researc h
sho\ving that uncertainty has differenrial dfens on people according to their
aversion to risk. While all of these oqjenions raise important qualifications
that may limit the practical application of our analysis iu certain situations,
none fundamentally undercuts our pn�jen. Indeed, even i f all of the
objections were otherwise insurmountable. our· rest·an:h would nevertheless
suggest that policy makers could accomplish greate•· deterrence by focusing
public attention on already existing and high tv ttncenain aspects of civil and
criminal sanctioning.

The prima•y purpose of this Article is not to establish, once and for all,
that increasi11g uncertainty with resp<>ct w th<:- -;izc of the sa11ction and the
probability of detection is desirable, or n·en the more modest goal that
increasing u ncerta i nty is necessarily de irable from an efficiency-based
perspective. Instead, our aim is to expand the traditional paradigm beyond

12.
_<.;,.,, l-Iard & St"gal, wpm note R at 277. Tlw lt-g-ituu;llt' moral concern ol the viCLims or
tile 1wo crinH::.. however, seems likelr to be quilt: difkn--ul
13.

SPI' dbcus.,inn

wfm Pans lll.:-\.1-2. Ill. B. I-�-
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rhe focus on the size of the sannion and the probability of detection as the
means by which law can deter wrongful behavior. There is an additional
imponant tool at the disposal of policy makers and legislators: the power to
manipulate the certainty of rhc size of sa11ctions and the certainty of the
probability of their imposition.

AN EXPERit-IE. ;TALJ:\.1\'ESTICATTON OF THE
DETERRE. T EFFECTS OFU CERTAINTY

JI.

This

part

de CJ;bes

and

presentS

the

resultS

an

of

experiment

conducted in order to investigate the effectS of uncertainty. Section A
provides the theoretical foundarions for the experiment, explaining the
differenr meanings of uncenainty and the ways in which manipulating
uncertainty could promote deterrence. Section B sketches in more detail the
purposes of the experiment as well as i[s limitations. Section C describes the
expe1·iment itSelf. Section D prt"sents the results.

A.

THJ:'OJU:TI(A"'· Fm·.,-oA ·noNs

\t\1ithin an efficiency framework. individuals comply with legal norms
based on an evaluation, implicit or orherwise, of the costs and benefitS of
compliance. One of the benefits of compliance with legal norrns is avoiding
the legal sanctions that follow from Yiolation of those norms. Hence, actors
make at least an implicitjudgrne111 regarding (a) the probability that norm
,·iolating behavior will be cletc:ete.d and (b) the nature (or the size) of the
sanction that will be impo ed in the cvem of detection. Becau c even the
best

informed,

utilil)·

maximi'l..ing

actor

unlikely

to

have

precise

information about either the probahility of detection or the size of the
sanction,

such judgments

arc

neces arily

made

under

conditions

of

unccrtaimy. Accordingly, a realistic account of the deterrent efe
f CL of legal
norms should address the- efe
f ct of uncertainty both with respect to the
nature and size of legal sanctions and with respecr to the probability of
••
detection on decision-making. ·
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\t\'ltat it means for the

\IU

of

a

sanction w be 111ore- or If'. s ccnain is

intuitively clear and, thus, needs liule explanation. A fixed fine fur a given
\vrong

is more ccnain than a fine in an amount that depends on the flip of a

fai r coin. Simi larly, a fine in an amount based on the flip of a fair coin is
more cenain than a fine i n an amount that depend· on one or more factors
that are les · predictable than rhe flip of

a

fair coin. such as a fi ne that

depends on the temperawre next week.
Cenainry in detection is more complicated. I n this regard we need to
make a crucial distinction between the

probalnlil)' of rletertion

JYrecision

and the

with which individuals arc able to know rhe probabiliry of detection. In
everyday speech. the- concept of certainty in detection could refer to both.
For example, it would be enrirely reasonable to say rhat one kind of crime,
which is

50% more likeLy

to be detected than another, is

moTe rr>rtain

to be

detected.
This

"

probabil ity of detection" aspen of certainty, however, is not what

concerns us here.

l n tead, we are i n vestigating the deterrent effect of

varying i n formation about the precision of the probabi lity of detection. I n
order n o t t o confound tht> effects o f "l ikelihood" and ·'precision,'' our
experimem holds constant the overall probability of detection

(at least

i n ofar as that is possible ) . The experiment varies, however, the precision
with which pan ic ipan L<; are able to know the probabiliry of detecLion. For
example, the experiment compare decisions in situations in wh ich there is
a defined risk of 30% of being fined to decisions in situations in which there
are equal chances that the probability of being fined will be either

40%.

20%

or

Similarly, the experiment compares decisions in situations in which

there is a defined risk of

go%

of being fined to decision· in situations in

\vhich the probability of being fined is either

20%

or

40%

and there is no

information regarding the- chances of the probabi lity being one or t h e
other. T h e situations in which the probability of being fined can b e either

20%

or

40%

involve greater unce rtaimy ( i n the sense that inte rests us here)

than the situation in which the probability is a definite

50

30%. ";

STA:-.i. L. REv. 1-17\ (19Y, ) . and Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen. l.aw rmd Belwuwral

Sciena: Renwumg !he Harumnlity As�umptwn from Law and Economics, 88 C.:.\L.

SeP alm

l.. RE\'. I 0:) I (2000).

Colin Camerer. fndu•idual Dmsmn Makwg, in HANDBOOK OF BEH:\\'IOR.Al. [C:O:>:O:-IIC'i:

BEHAVIORAL DEC:ISIO,._ M.-\KING 3�7-676 (Stanley Kaish et al. eels. .

1991) (reviewing behavioral

decision research): Da\1d Cohen and Jack L. KnetSch, judictal Choice and Dispanlies Between

Mmsures of Economzr

research findings

15.

to

\ ·alue.s, 30 OS<:OODE HALL

LJ.

737

( 1992)

(using behavioral decision

explain a varietv of common law doctrines).

From the perspective or expected utilicy theory, the distinction drawn here 111ay seem

peculiar. Harel and Segal explain:
Expected utilit� theorv does not distinguish between lotteries and compound

loueries (lotteries in '"hic:h the outcomes themselves are lotteries ) . For t':xamplt> if
a person believes that thcrt: is an equal chance that the enforcement probability
detection i�
detection is

5% a11d 13� . rht:n effeCLively
10% ( 0 5 X 3t1: -r (}..-, X 13%).

she believes that the prohabilitv of

THE \ ·7Rn '1:}; OF UNCERTAINTY IN LAW

4.5 1

Some prior research in law and econom1cs has begun to explore the
possibilir)

that

t-isk

and

uncertainty

may

be

harnessed

to

enhance

deterrence. For example, some tons theorists have raised the possibility that
11
Others have pointed out that

uncertainty could produce over-deterrence. 1

attitudes towards risk are relevant to understanding the deterrent effects of
increasing 1he probability of deteclion as compared to increasing the size of
17
a sanction. Yet, more complex forms of uncertainty such as the concept of
sentencing loueries. detection loneries, or even the relevance of ambiguity
(i.e. uncertainty about the relative risk) 111 as a tool ro increase deterrence.
have not been investigated either theoretically or empi1ically outside the
1!1

field of taxpayer compliance.

Two areas in which this omission seem

quite striking are determinate

sentencing in criminal law and punitive damages in tOrt law. During the

Hard & St'gal ,

wfJro

decision-makt>r:-.

do

nme 8,

;n

303-04. But the li terawre on

not treat uncertain probabili L ie

ambiguity suggests that

very

orten

in tlw way tht>\" rreat knmm probabilities.

Sl'e id.

(.[ .John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell . Somd]Jrrl' oj Uncn1anlty on ComplirmrPiuilh Legal
RE\". 965. 965 ( 1984) (aq�uing thai uncenaint,· over lc>gal standards will
prochK.- _,u\r-optimal C'ompliancc because ri sk aver�<· individ uals ,,-ill ·over-com ph'") . Al1hou�h
this <11 1d r.-lated later work, Richard Craswell & john E. Calfet:. UP1t'11'f'IICP and Ul/(l'/1ain Legal
Standard.'. ':l j . l . . Ec:ON. & 0Rt:. 279 ( 1986). arc: sig n ifican t <"XC<'ption� 10 the �cneT-al tendency tn
ignoH' 1l11Ct'rtaimv, tlw unct>rtainry addn::�!>cd is that ol 1he cont.-nt of tht· lt•g<tl � tandard in
que�tion. 11Ui The probability of detenion or size or ilw �an cl ion. Sll· Mark r. Grady. .-\ ,,·,,11.
15.

Slandrm/.,. 70 \' \. 1 ..

Po�1lm!' Fmnmnir Tlmny of Neglig;mre. 92 YALI· I.J. 799, X l :� ( 1 983): Gillian Hadtleld. ll't•igh111g lhP
l'nh11' of I ·fiJ!Itl'lll'\..1. A 11 f.(UIIOmir Pen11P.Cihw un Puri5iun in 1111• l.(lw. Ht CAl .

Jason
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Ambiguity rep�t·sents the lack o f

confidence,

one ha.' concerning the relative lik el ihood of en�n ts.
ba lls <\lld tlftv

or

l..tck

or reliability or

the

mlormation

Jr a person kno"·� that the n: are fifty blatk

"'hite balls 111 an um. a person knows thai the prol>abil i1y that a ,,·bite ball be
picked up a1 random 1s :>0%. If a person knows Lhat there <lre 100 balls some of which a•·e whiw
while 01heL� art' blatk. a person faces ambiguit,·-ambi�ully which is found ed on ignorancl'
wil11 respen to the relevam probabilities. Tht' da�sie<1l ex pennJelH sugges1ed bv Ellsberg
illusu-ates llw concept of ambiguitY. Suppose an urn LOnlains nin <·t� balls. 1hin' of "·hich are
kn own to be n:llo". while eath of the other sixtY is kncnm lO be ei1her blu.- or red, but 1lw
exau compositivn ol these sixry ball� i� unknown. fn �·ach ot the llt'XI fow loneTies. ont> b,JII
will be p11·kt'd a1 rand om , and the d<"cision mak�-r '"ill be paid au:orcling t o its colot. Tlw Iolli
lonerin arc: $100 il' wlltM. zero olhen,i�e; $100 il blue:'. 1.ero orhenvise: $100 if ''cllow or rc:d .
zero if blue: and $100 if blue or red. z<·ru if ,.t'llo,,·. Elbberg suggc>sL' 1ha1 must deci�ion-makc>r�
prc•fer tlw lirl>t louen LO the !>C'Cond . hut thc founh to tht th ird. This prefer<:'nre viola1e�
standard pn>babili1y 1heory, sin re a dt>CT,i<m-makt·r "·hu p•d"t-r!> t he first lc>tLt·r� to 1he second
.
IT\eab 1hat h� belie,·e:- "yello,,··· l<> be molt' lik<·l� th.m .. blue .. On the tllh�·• hand. prc>ft>rrinll.
.
the la�t Iutter; w t lw 1hird rt'Wab that. f01 thi' detl5inn make1 . . bin�· 01 r\·d" i:-. m•m• likeh" Itt
.
happen than .vel low rH red."' ht'IH"e blllt' i� more li!..eh than yel lt)\\ . a contradiction. Ser Danid
Ellshcrg. Rtlk, A mbiguif.\. and thf Sm•a!J.P :hiom.1. 75 Q. J. E( 1)1'. 6-U. 64�-6\J ( 1961 ) . Thes<' and
�imilar rt:�lliL� \\'Crc· rt•peated i n n1an' <'XiwrinH:nts \"1'1 Kenneth R. �hrCri mn wn &: S1i!{ L11 'o11.
( 'tilil) Tlmm·
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I�O( H i
fierce debates 0\·er :-.v utt·ncing guidelines. 1 1 0 serious considcra c i o n a p pears
w have been giv<'n ro t l t c possibility that i n c reasing Ct'rtaimy migh t und('rcut
�"
vV h i le this omission mav be under-;tanclable. givt n rhat the
deterre11ce.
'

se11tencing guidelines debate was conducted i n nLOr<il rather than eco t t om ic
rerms, the correspondi ng omission i n discussions of· p u n i tive damages is
more difficult to explain. Qui te recent <;tudies on pu niti,·c damage<>, -;ome of

w h i c h explicill} i n corporate de-velopments in behm·ioral dec ision re-search,
assume wi t h ou t questioning that Uitccnainr) i n sa nc t io ns is undesirable?

This assu m ptio n is t:'specially troubling because the researchers ttse their
tindings regarding llw u ncena i n ty ofjut)' decision making to argue for legal
reforms

limiting jlll;·

discreti o n .

Yet,

the

more

foundational

quest i on

,

whether unccnaimy is indeed undesirable (at least \,•ithin t he efllciency
ba ed framework i n which the research is couducted). typical!}' is disc ussed
only summarily i n an i n troducwry paragraph-a i->aragrapl t which reiterates
the conviction that uncenaimy with respen to t h e size ol' punitive damages
��
is both unj ust and i nefficienL.
Efli ciency considerations suggest that deterrence -;huuld be maximized
for a give n level of expenses. Aft e r all, the goal of cleLerrence is harm
-

preve n t i o n ; redu c i ng the cost of preventi n g hartn de-arly is desirable from

:-.n· K.\ rF <;·t ITI t &:
OF J l"Dt:I:'\C:: St::;o.T
.; E!\:C:IN<: GL !DEI.I-.:F.� 1-.: Til� FEOERAL COLR IS 3'd-77
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For ,t tlwrough '>lii"\'C)' of tlw hi�LOI")' of tht> �<'lllt>11CIIlg g111ckhnt:s,

�0.

. JOSE .-\. C:AC\R.\1'��'>. FI·-·\R

l'l''i!Stl\l�SI Y I 9-6Y (200Y). The initial inspirmion of the !{Hicll'lilll'' "'l'
discrctiun. At a latl'r stag(' the .sente:-ncing bill

(thr bill \\'ltich

guidelines) benun.: ··wugh<"r� un crime and its ·· toHghnt's�..
cltt...:rrtnr.:. Yet. the dime11sion which interestS
and dispanrv. •tppears

or deterrence.

10

Itave been justified

us

\\';L,

a

misuust ofjudicial

t'St th li�hes thl' sentencing
,

.th<• ju�tificcl in tenus of

l ien:. ltanH·Iv tltt· tt·dnttion ot uncertainty

exclusively in tcnm. ul J U�tire rather than in terms

21.
St·1• Oantt·l Kahut:man et al., Shored Outl'(lgr and r:mtltr . \wnrtf, Tht· P.lyiholog:,· of Punitivt•
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�075-76 ( 1 99�): W. Kip Viscusi. '1111• Soria/ C<w� of Puillllt'l' f>tllllllft
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Y2.
Thu�. for example, Stmstcin, Schkade &: Kallilt>tnan ,u glw that ·· ["'I hate\·e,· their

A.l.fl'5.lin!{

ulrmtat<' purpn�t>s, the most widespread concern ahmu puniU\e dant.l).;l'S h;c. beett that they arc
unpredictable. e\·etl ·out "f comro1.··· Sunstcin et at..

�upm •wte � I

. •

1t �U7;) . They further argue

that:

l i l t is not hard to understand the widespread <.on\.'t'nt "·irlt ernnic pt•nitive

... .tnd <lt-knclanL� alike-are
d;una!{e aw,tnk If �•milarl)' siwatcd people-pl.dntiiT.
lltll li'C<Itt::d 'imiJa r)}'• crr<tliC awards arc llltfail . .
extre11td�

high

awards i s likely

w

produc...:

.

. [;\ js

,I

pr<H

cxce�si\l·

<

I II

,tl lll<lltl'l, a risk Of

,lllrion

in

risk-avt>rse

ntanagers Jnd companies. Hence unpredictablt: awards ne<ll<' bvth unfairness and
(on rea�on.tble ,tsstunption ) indlicicnc}, in a

wa� Lllilt Ill <I\

m t•rdeter

desi reable

.tCli\ it\'

SPe id. at 207!)-.77. On thr <>titer hand, Viscusi argues that ··puniti\·,. cl:unagc·s have no Si!{ltitlcant
deterrent

ellc
:n'"

(a ncl

an:

therefore

unprt>dittahh-. Sn· \'i,cn�i. ' 1 1/lfll note

inefficient) .

� I . at 288-99.

in

�ig-nili(a1 1 1

pan

b.:caust'

they are

.

THE VIRTUI:.'S OF UNCU�T\1.\. 1'1' J.• J.A W

453

an efficiency perspective. If li1 1Certainty enhances the deterrent effect of a
given set of legal rules a11cl enforcement procedures. it may be possible to
reduce the ex pec ted sannion. h'ithout decreasing itc; deterrent effects, by
i ncreasing the uncenai 1 1 l \ . Uncertainty could be used to implemenr the
principle of parsimony-the principle that sanctions should be as small as
:?:�
possible. For example. it individuals a1·e risk averse to punishment lonecies,
then greater deterrcnc<:' could be obtained for the same sanctions, or
alternatively the same- le,TI of deterrence could be obtained from smaller
sanctions.
This consideration set>ms e, ·ide n r in criminal law. Jmposing sanctions i n
criminal law i s ex pen�: ;i \·t·. J r t h e average length o f imprisonment can be
reduced, this may sa''<" costs rhat would othenvise be inCLn-red by the state.
These costs include t h e costs of n1aintaining prisons as well as t h e cos ts
involved i n disrupting people ' s lives (both those in prison and those outside
who depend on them ) . l n addition. if the average size or fines can be
reduced, this would lower rhe risk bearing costs of people potentially subject
:!4
to Lhe fine. Alterna ti\'el�·. if tht a\'erage detection rate can be lowered.
there will be savings in e r 1 l orcement costs. Similar considerations also apply
to tort law. l n the standard law and economic account, the primary purpose
of ron damages i deterrence.:!·, If uncertainty serves as a ·'force multiplier.··
then a smaller numbt"r of tort actions can p1·ovide the same deterrem etfecl
as a larger numbe;-r of more certain actions, a t a lower combined cost.
Indeed, it may be that the widely condemned ''lotrery'' aspects of ron
litigation enforcernt>nt i nn-case tlw de terre nL effects of a ton Ia''' rt>gtme
.
�
r
charactenzed by rampallt under-enrorcement.
8.

BEN·\ F/Uit:\1. 01-L'/S/0.\' RfSF.iii�C:H O.V UN<:F.Ifli\ 1,\TI .

Prior behaYioral ckcision research suggests that uncenaimy ha
predictable effects 011 (\t-cision-rnaking, depending on the \''ay that a choice
is framed. For exampl e. research panicipants in a wide variel)' of settings
tend ro be risk avt"rse '�it h respect to gains and risk seeking with respect to
losses. Faced ,.vith a choin· benv-ecn a certain gain. say $5, ancl a 25 �, chance
ro get fom times rh<1t amount, more subjects prefer to take- $5 de spi t e the
fact Lhat rhe expened Yalue of both options i� exaclly the same. Conversely,

:23.
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�Y tOWr\ L\ 1 \' H.D 'lfvr
laced \,·itlt a ch<�ice between a certain loss a n d a

�:;q

[ �0041

cl1ance of losing four

rirne� that anwunt. more subjects prefer lO takt· their chances, once again
despite the fau thai the expected value of both options is exactly the same.
Behavioral decision researchers refer to thi

phenomenon as the rdlectio11

effect or the gain/loss fram ing effect. and rhey explain this efFect i n terms of
:;
loss a\ersion.
People are so av('rse tO actually incu1Ting a loss thar they are
��
willing w risk a larger loss in order to avoid a certain smaller lo-s . . In other
words, when all the options present the possibility oF loss. loss aversion leads
ro a mste for ri.-k.
Two

main

finding·

from

behavior-al

decision

research guided our

experimental design. Fir t, both uncertainty i n probabi liry and uncenaimy
in omcome have similar, preclicrable effeCLs on decision-making (along the
lines of t h e reflection effect discussed above. i.e. risk a,·crsion with gains, risk
:.�·
Second,
-eeking with respect tO losse , and subject to bmt��dary effects)_
within

a

given range of probabilities or outcomes, incli"iduals are ··ambiguiry

averse" meaning that they dislike uncertain choices more intensely when
:m
they do not know the odds of the outcome at any given point in the range.
Our experiment tests these

findings in

the context of uncertainty

regarding Lhe consequences of a violation of a legal norm. The experiment
examines

Lhe

preferences

of

participants

rt"garding

rwo

aspects

of

uncertainty: uncertainty i n Lhe probabiliry of detection and uncen.ainty i n
the size of t h e sanction. With

respect to the size of the sanction. the

experiment tests participants' preferences under three different conditions:
certainty (in which the sanction is fixed), risk (in which there are nvo
equally possible sanctions) and uncertainty ( i n \,·hich there are two possible

27.
Ser genemll_)' CHOICF.S, VALL;L<;, At\:D FRA;\IES (Oanid K<ll111tlllan & Amos Tversky t:ds.,
W
� OO) (colltcLiug leadi ng essays growing out of "l\ersk\ and h.Lthncman's research on prospect
theory); Daniel Kahncman & Amos Tvcrsky. Pr
o
s
pert Theoy:
1 ;-\n .-1 IWiyJis of Decision Under Ris/1, 47
E<:o:-.:o�u::TRIC.\ 26� ( 1979); Amos Tvcrsky & Oanid �lhn..:m,lll. l?allol!al Chotce (!lid the Fmming
of Decisions, 59 J. BL=s. 251 ( 1 986); A.rnos Tversky & Da niel -:;thnetnan.
1
The Framing of Decisions
nnd ti'U' Psychology of Choice. 2 1 I SCIENCE 453 ( 1981). There b ,, boundary effect that explains tht:
appeal of loneries and slm machine�, however. Su�i<'<"b app�·.1 r 10 bt· risk-sec.:king whc::n there is
a small possibilirr of

a

\·ery large gt�i n. Converse!). �ubje<

h

.tppea r

w

be risk-avoitling when

there is a small probability of a very large loss. Tlli, law:r phe nomenon may· help to expl.tin

what mar ·eem to be inordinate publ ic concern about km !Iequ�·ncv high damage evems such

as nuclear accidetiiS. ,)'pp HOWARD MARGOLIS. Df.\LI'i<. \1'1 I I I RISK: \\'I!Y THE Pl:BUC :\�0 THI::

EWERTS

28.

OISA<.;REI:: I �m ( 1996).
See Amos

Dependent NfmU>l.

Tverskr & Daniel Kahneman. l.oss Au,.,.11"'' in Riskless Choice: A Reftrenre·
Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1040 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (rt·\·ie\\'i ng pre\'i<.llt:. lindings regarding los:.

IOli

aversion in risky choices and extending theory LO account f(n· los..; ,,,·crsion in riskless choices).

29

See Oa\id V.

Budescu et al., 1Hudeling Cntaull.) l:'quiun.lrnt.s Jot Imprecise Gambles. 88

0R<.;ANIZA!'IONAL BEl 1\\', & HL'M. DECISION PROCI::SS�-'> 7-IH. 7· 1V-50 (2002).

30.
See E.llsberg, supra note 18, at ()4�-69; M�tcCrimnHHt c L<trson, supm note 18, at :�6976: .lee also Gideon Kerrn & Leonie E.M. Gerritstn. On thr kolm�tw·" nnd Pn.wblr Arrnunts nj
Ambi,e,wl\' thwloion. 10:-\ .-\CI'.\ PSYC :IIOLOCICA 1 4.9. I m1 ( 199\1!
•
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11
anction but no information abom their relative Jikelihood ) . With respect
to the probability of detection. the experiment te ts participants
preferences under three corre ponding condition : certain probability ( i n
which the probabili[)' of detection i a fixed percentage ) . ri k) probability
(in which there are n,·o pos ible probabilitie of detection, the relative
likelihood ofwhich i known ) . and uncertain probability (i n which there are
two po siblc probabilities of detection but no information abom their
3�
relative likelihood ).
For ca ·c of eli cussion. we call these three condition .. ccnain," ··risky,"
and ..uncertain" when referring to both the ize of anction and the
t of detenion. A certain sanction is therefore a fine of X dollars. A
probabili y
risky sanction is a fine of cirher Y or Z dollars when the probability ofY and
Z are known, for example, '"'hen they depend on the outcome of tossing a

fair coin. An uncertain sanction is a fine of either Y or Z when the
probabilit ies are unknown. Similarly, the probability of detection i certain
when it is X%. The probability is risky \vhen it is either Y% or Z% and the
probability that it is either Y% or Z% is known. for example. when the
probability depends on the results of to sing a fair coin. The probabili[)' of
detection i uncertain ,,·hen it i either Y% or Z% and the probabili[)' that i t
i Y% or Z % is unknown. The combinations r e ulting from these conditions
can be repre emed in wbk form. Each box in Table A repre ent a different
combination of experimental conditions. For example, box '-1 repre ems the
c�e in which the anction i risk) and the probability of detection i certain.
The boxe are numbered so that ,,·e can refer to the combination� lates· in
the Anicle.

'-\ I

1 111, clJ,IIIlC 11011 bt'l\\t'l'll

!)l<>babih�IIC and

II \It' lll1(l'll.lllll}

C OIIt''IJCilHI'

Ill

thai

ht•twn·n I "" .llld IIIHt'l l:lllll\ llltJ:.I 131111)11'<1� associat�rl \\llh Knlghl . .\11 ;!I'IIIWII) rR'"" H.
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I·Rf\1'>: 1'1

'' ' '
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d

.t
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t•llht't tlw .11111111111 ''' 1lw s.t1 H I I 0 1 1 01 lilt:' probability ot dt•tt't tion 1:. t omplt•tt•h unknm,·ll

twc .111'1' 'II' h
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c ondtlltlll '" """ 1101 ha\t· <JIJOI,·t'd
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II> i">l.ttt· llw dkc 1 1 1 1 till< t'ltallll\

,L,

H9 /0\IV.:\ /.A W 1<1-.Tlf:"Y\'

I �!HH I

T:\fH.f A
SIZE OF S.\'.!CTI0:-.1
Li K E I . I H UOO OF DED:C:TI0:-.1

CNC :ERT.\1.

Rl. KY

CERT ·\1. PROB:\HILITY

7

RISKY PRO�AB ILITY

8

U � < : E RT \ I N PROB.-\BIL .ITY

9

There are a few prelimi nary observ;uions to be made with respect to this
tahle

and

it!)

applicabil ity

unct'rtainty refe r

outside

the

laboratory.

Fit·sr,

cenainty

or

of individuals A sancrion is

ro the subjective con\'iction

certain i f the potential criminal or torLfeasor

she or he knows it<;

believf'�

magnitude. Second, different individuals have di fferent information and
th erefore the control of the legal system over the cenainty or uncertainty of
the relevant parameters is lin1ited. Sometimes, the ve1y same scheme or rules

\vi i i appear more certain to some actor-; than others. For instance, it is l i kely
rhar the same rules may be seen as falling within our "cenain" or ·'risky" cells
by more experienced offenders while tht' · will be seen 'L<; fall i n g within our
··uncenain" cells by less experienced off<'"tlders. Third, as thi

suggests. each

box in the table represen t-; an idealization that is not fully reali?.able in the
contt"Xt of a modern legal syst em. Although a legal system 1T1ay adopt rule
or practices that i nfluence the degree of certainry r·egarding sanction or the
probability of detection, the manipulability of certainty is l i m i ted. Finally,
the rreaunent of uncertainty is likclr to depend in practice on an almost
i n f i n i te and diverse set of factors. including contextual facwt-s that cannot
ahvays

be

examined

experimentally.

For

example,

people

may

treat

uncertaiuty differently depending on whether it involves small or high
l
:n
or whether i t invol\'eS fines or impri onmen r.·�· Uncertainty
probabi l i ties
111ay also depend on their
�"

legal norm in question

u�jective understandi ngs of the legitirnacy of the
or the existence of extra-legal sanctions Stich as

shame:.
As a result of these and other limitations on th i::; kind of research, there
are

difficultie-

in

classifying

nead"

.. real

world"

ituations

i nto

rhese

:B.

For a n:\·iew of the lilernwre

:�-1.

For reasons why people ma> ht n:<k �n· kn1" \,·i t h re::sp<:rt lO tntprisonm�:m. �t-C' Harel &

:�!i

q: Bntmrlmy l�(ferL�.

gl'nc:-rally NL\RGOLIS. mpm note '27.

<HI

liw prohl..-rn of high impan. low freq nen�:y r·isk.�.

s<-c

St-gal . �UfJrtt note H at 295-97.

.

.mjmt nme 7. :11 �·7 1 {cli�ClL
'>Sing t hei r decision tn rnune a p0u·mial

La:'\ clecluction ;Ls being one that the IRS di:.<di<mt>d ror ret,nns 1 hat 5onw arconntan L'- did not

.tgiTl' \\ith).
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somewhat idealized nine combinations and, conversely, i n creating rt>ali'itic
simations in rhe laborator-y . . ;t'venheless, the experimental approach ha.
great advantages i n that i t allows for the isolation of reJe,·am ,·ariahlfs i n
vvays that are n o t possible outsick o f 1 hC:' laboratory.

C.

'li -lt: E'<.PERJMENr

PmticijJants and Design: Forry-four undergraduate students from The
Hebrew

U niversity

of Jerusalem

participated

in

the

experi ment.

The

participants were recruited through a campus advertisement promising a
monetary reward for participaring i n a deci ion making task. The design was
a ··within subject" design, so 1 h a t <'<'lch of the subjects participated in all th<"
experimental conditions.
l0

Procedure: Upon arrival

the labora10ry, the subjects lvere seat<"d i n

front of a personal moniwr and gi,cn instructions concerning the t a k . All
questions concerning the expt>riment were answered and instructions ,..,�ere
repeated until the participants indica1ed that they fully undcrswoci the
i nstructions.
The e-xpe1imem was fully computerized. During the insb·uctions, the
panicipants learned tllat t h<"y would be asked lO make decisions in rwenry
s<"ven rounds of the experiment. and that they would be pairl on 1 h e basi

of

their decisions i n two of the rotmds. which would be selected random tv
. afL<:·•·
11;
r h ey completed the decisions in all the rounrls.'
Pa ni ci panrs were
e ncouraged to think carefully about each of the decisions.
In each round. participants were asked to choose between option A and
option B. In each case, option A. was a d<"cision to do nothing and rhcrefort>
n

IS 40 (about $8 ) ·

keep the

1hat they were paid for participating. l n each

case. option B was a deci ion to recei\'c an additionaJ NIS

30

(about

would expose them to a 1·isk of ··bei ng caught and required to pay

a

$<i)

1hat

fine.'' In

· ts �0

each case 1 h e potential fine was larger than t h e additional

the

participant would r<"ceive if she or he chose option B. The potential fines
ranged from JJS

�5

$7) ro
5 % to 60%.

(about

rletcction ranged from

IS

70

(about $15) . The probabilitie

of

The C\\fe n tv-se\'en rounrl� incl uded Llw n i n e types of logicallv pos. ible
combinations prese-nted in table A above. with each of r h ree clitl"erent
expened values. Thus, for each of the n i nt> combinations there were 1 hn"e

Th!" praniu· ol p;t\.11!� suhjcn� on dw basi .s ol a ran do11 1 seh·nion anulllg JIHIIii pk
:�1)
.
n Hind:. i� a com moll pr;tni< t• 1 n lwha' 1< 1ral dct isio11 1 •·:-,·arch bt·C<t liM' i 1 k<"t·p� •·ach chr 111 t• Ji:-b

and. 1!111�. J>lt'\.t'lliS p:-snit •pa1H� l rom ! J almng all !lw rounds .ts

IJ<:ndi1:-. ol
'' ith

a

Ollt:

g.tnw Cthcreb' tt•;tli·;ing th<"

1lw Jm,· of l.trgc ntllllbcJ·s). In addnion. 1hi' pranin· ..t ll<.n,·,

hmited amount ql rr:-.< lllrC<:'

""Jl<"lllllt·nl "·hnhe1 r l ! t•\

,,.t:,..:

a

grnnr1 numb•·• ol 1dals

Bec;JIIw th<" ��tl�jen., nnh ic,u1lt'd

··caugln" and

.. tiJH"cl.. in ilw two rouncb that

a1

l

lH·

t'JHI ol the

w<·n· -cl•·nt•d. lh<'fl'

'h<>llld IIIII h<l\<' h<'t'll ,jgnifiCl l l l lt•arlling t'fk< L� IJ\'t•l l ht• (Ollll>(' ol ill<" C:--JWriliWI 11
:�7.
lWI'Ill\

.\1 ilw ri i1lc ol ilw

I <'Ill-;.

<'XJWrimcJII

a

"".

l�r;wli Slwkd (�1!-.1

"·L'

"·onh ,Jiglnh lll<JJ<· 1h;m

H�) IOWA /.A W 1-U:T/r;W
rn l l nds wirh the ;;anH' stntctun· but cliff{· n�nt <"Xpt:'ctecl

r �oo- 1- 1

va l l l es

.

I t t ord<."r 10

pn'\'{;'1 1 [ erfects or order. the sequence i n which the twenty- ·e,·c n c h oi ct:s
appeared on tht' screen was arhitrary and changed from one panicipam w

l o t h e r.

<t l

Table

B

summarizes

ci. i ffe rt> n t

the

choices

offered

panicipants. Recall that in each case. the participam faced a

tS

d o in g nothing (and keeping the

40)

c h o i ce

or taking a11 additional

w

the

between
l

·r

30,

;;u�ject to the risk of being caught a n d requ i red to pay a fine. Table B
summarizes the clifferenr chances of be ing caught and the di ffe rent fines

f�Ked i n each of the twenty-se\'f::· n possibilitif' .

TABLE B

SU Ml\·IARY OF EX PERiivf i.:: � TAI. CO�IBI. ATIONS

(EXPECTED VALUES: 0=. flS

2'�; E=t IS 1 5;

F=NIS

7.5)

SIZE Of' SA:--ICTIO:-.:
U:-.11:ERT:\1:--1

O.RTAI:"\

l.!!-:EI.ILIOOU

c>F DEl F.< rtO:\
n

D: 1()91-. :\IS C.O

( }�RT:\1:-...
PROB,-\BI l.ITY

PROIIABII.I IY

D: 111%/1\.IS 70"'

;;o

F '\O%t :"\IS -I:'i

f.: �0% "'

F i>rJ<k/�IS -,:. m .I:>

·itl'ii./ :-...'I S 'itl

[) -,•t "' I ,-,.-�

E.· :!tt';;

"'

:\IS 7tl ur :\11

HI'� I :-<1$ liO or

Ill

F.-IU% ur tit1%/:\IS 1:.

U;-.;n.RTAI:\
PRI)I\:\Hil.rt\'

The

D: :\% or l.'i%I NIS Oil

F.: '10% ur 40%/ !'\IS :;o
F: 4tl%

expec ted

ur

;,n

E :In% INI!> fitl or ·W

0: 5'k nr 15% • :"IS Ott

RISK\'

1n<; :-Jl!> ;n ,.,

E.. :�U%/'\!1$ i)t)

D · :>% or I ;;%/ :->IS 70 ur �,o

F" '10% "r ·111%1 'il$ 1}1) c>l ·Ill

F: 40% or flll'ii-/ NIS ;,;; or :1:;
() �•''i

"' I ;o.;

NIS 7tJ ur 511

f.. :!0'; "' -Ill<:( I

60%/:-.'IS ·1:'>

:\IS fill oo ·10

0: !>%

<>t

I :;<t/ F'IS 70 or ;,u

E. '10% 01 411%/ ><IS t)O or ·Ill
F: 40% c•r tiO%/NIS ;;;, <II '15

values of all the D combinations are identical i n every

ce l l . l i kewise with the E a nd

F combinations. The

expected value or the additional N I,

:�0

expected value

are the

that the parti cipa nrs received for

taking the action, m i n us the e xpec t ed value of the sanction. The expected
value of eac h of th e D co m b i natio ns was

. IS 24,

the expec ted value of each

or th e E combinations was NlS L 5 . and 1he expected value of each of the
co mbi

n ati o ns was

1.,

IS 7.5.:

Thus. the

ex pected

F

value of option B (taking a

risk) was always better than option A (dning nothing).
�H.

As a re\'iew of Table B sho,,·s. we \;tri<·d tilt• exp�cted value� by manipularing both Lhe

sit.<' of the anction and rhe probability of dt"lt'c LiCin. V\'c did this i n ord�r to prod11ce

a

strong

test of the elh:ct of uncertainty ,,·irhin an t-xpcnmc:ut of manageable duralion. If we had varied
the expected v:�lue b)' m:�nipulati11g nnl} the ;.in· of the sanction we would be unable to ""Y with

a11\' nm!idencc whether uncerr.aimy would haq·

.t

�i111ilar c::!Tect at different prc>bability le1cls.

Srmilarly, if wt- had varied the expectt>d '<dllt' h1 lll,tnipulating only the probability of' derection
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The difference> ben\ieen ·'risky'· and ··uncertain" ,,·as as follows. For the
"risky" factor, the panicipants were told that there was a 50% chance of each
of the rwo possible conditions. For the "uncertain" fanor, the participants
were told that t.here were two possible conditions, but that they could not
know the chances that it would be either of the two
which

i nvolves

what

behavioral

economi ts

label

.

'l!.l

This is an option
40
The
"ambiguity.''

complete instructions ( translated from Hebrew) appear in the Appendix.
After

each

paruCJpanr

completed

the

twen ty-seven

rounds,

the

computer selected two rounds at random. For those rounds i n which option
B was selected, the participants carried out the lotteries, using a coin ro
determine the outcome of

50/50 lotteries and a ten-sided die

w

decem1ine

the result of lotteries involving other probabilities. By being asked to wss a
coin or a die, participants were given a sense that they were not being
manipulated or misled. In addition, the use of the coin and the die (shown
to the participants at the omse t of the experiment) gave the participants a
concrete sense of the probabilities involved. The participants v•ere then paid
according to the

results

and

debriefed concerning

the

goals of the

experiment (and pmmised that their identities and the choices they made
would remain confidential ) .
Our null hypothesis was that the legal ethos (according to which
uncertainty in anction is avoided and uncertainty with regard to the
11
probability of detection is LOierated)' promotes enicient deterrence. This
hypothesis would predict that participants would be neutral or averse> to
uncenaimy in detection while preferring uncertainly in sanction. We also
predicted that panicipams would be averse to 1he transilion from risk

Wt'

wuuld bt> unable:- l<J �ay with a1w rrHllidc-nn' wht·thtr tmcenainiY "'ould hav�·

a

lO

:;imilar effect

at different sanction le,·t'll>. Scparatt'l�· manipulating 1he sizc:- tJI t l w sannion and rhc probabilil\

of dc::t eCiion wo11ld have rt-f]llired doubling thl· duration ot the rxpl:riment, doubling 1he cost

and itKrl·asing tht' pou:ntial fau�tte of the parucipants. A� a n·�uh, although

,,.<'

can �av th<n

sanction si.!:c, pmbabili1v of dt>tt'CIIon. and tmc... nainr� all affen panicipanL< . densiom. "'t'

rannot (()lllpilrt' the �>i7C' of the t'fkrL... or tht'St
' three;' \'llliiiblt'S. All expt'l illll"ntal J't'SCarrh

involw·� trad<."-olb ot 1 his �on.
��.

Pk�e now

1ha1

for

l!w

t

ombinati•Jns inn>lviug an llllrt•nain

�ant tion

iLl' nr

probabi!it) of dt:tection ''e < a lt nlat t·cl the expt-rll•d value b�· loll•>"'lll).{ tlw Bernoullt;.�n principle'

of equalh weighting Jil l he pos�ihilitit's. In �implt:. intuitiw tetm:- thai means trt·<Hillg a rangl· a...
if it "'t'l(' thl.' t111dpoi nt o! iht' rall�l' Thus. for instance, Opiion n on tlw IO\\'t•J left Ct'll 111\'<Jh'\'CI
a kHH't\ which gan· panidpant� t·it ht· r 5� or I :J<,W. p1 obabilil\ or lo�in){

did nol kti<l\\' wlwtlwr tht· pt ob;tbibt\ "'OLtlcl hl: ."l'� <>I 15%.
tilt' pwbabilit�· th .., l.t< ··d

..rbk� ·· a nd ··unct'natn-

h c.tlcul<itt•d

<

as J ( ll� . L•ndcr this app r<>.J( 11 tlw t' Xpt•( t('(\ \ <thlt'� or ilH·

V\UT:-.. \'\D FR:\�11-.-.. \U{JIII llOI<:' '27. cll 2-3.
·1 1

St•t•

or 1 ht· Bt'rnoulli<tn

I 'n(lll''· nnd Fmll/t'l.

\llfJm noll· I X anrl .Kt<llli JMllVJng l l'�l.
dc•J. Iilt•rl cl iM ll..�illll 'll I hi-.. It-gal "' hll�. "'(' illjl'll P;H I'

r... .I

'IS GO. \'t·L partiripa111�

tlw tknHHtlli,tn pnnripk.

•>ml)i H.:tuons a1 e idt'lll ira!. For a d>�ntssion

P1 itlltplC'. �l't' Dan!t'l �\n hema t t & :\mos T1 n,;k1·, C/witt'.'·
-Hl.

l l udt·J

Ill

C:i!OICF.�.

I I I . A. f -�. I l l . g I -�.
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ttllcenaint\. This

c

onj enu r< ' ,,·as ba:--ed on tht- rich litcratttrt' esta bl i s h i n g
':!

that inclividu..tls are ambigui ty-averse.

Framing By des ig n , the n.:pet·i r n <:- t l l did not include a

framing.

·'thick"

Participants

were

not

LO

asked

ve-ry

i m agi u e

de ta i l e d or

tlwmsel\'es

com m i t t i ng a particular crime or a civil wrong. I n s tead . the- insrrucrions
si m p l y g<m:· the

pa rtici pa n ts an unclerstattding that c ho osi n g

the risky

alternative i m·olved con H l t t t t i ng a wro ng !'or whiclt they could bt· ·'caught"
and mack to pay a "fi n e . " Thus, the i nS U"l t r ti o n:. stated that ·'if �'Oll choose
o p ti on B you w i l l get an add i ti o na l

caught and req u i red

to

:�o NJS. 8ut vou f�1 ce a risk of being

pay a fit t e . " [ f anything. tht· Hebrew words used fo r

"c a ugh t" and '·fine" suggest punis hmen t for a wrong e \·e n rnure strongly

than t.he English t ra ns lat i o n . These t. e n w ; were repeated in the i nst ru ctio ns

p rece d i ng each round. The intent was lo fra111e. i n as open-ended a form a::>
poss ible . choice B as a wrongful choice.
We chose such thin fram i ng because there i :.o little prior research on

the effect or u 1 t ccrtainty on deterrence. We wi she d to iso l a te ,

as

much as

possible, the effect of u n cert ainty . recogn i z i ng tilar thicke r framing co u ld
pr oduce di fferent results. For e xam p le . if c ho i c e B were framed so that i t

involved

a

Vt:l)' se ri ous wrong

thm

would

st rongl y violate

the

moral

sensibilities of research p arti c i pa n t<; and expose anyone who was caught

tO

substantial shame, it seems q ui te po ·sible that participams would have been
more reluctam to choose option B even in a la bo rato l)' context. The effec t
of thicker fra m i ng 1·equi res funher research .
Of cour'e. this choice o f framing is one reason for caution i n drawing

strong conclusions from our research. , evenheless, i t is precisely this need
for caution that emphasizes the sign i f i ca nce of this kind of research for the

e n ri c h m e nt of law and economic a n a lysi s . lf it is i m ponam to exercise
caution when dra•ving conclusions from an analysis that is sensit ive to the

effecr.s of u nce nai nry but consciously ignon:s the consequences of thick
fra m i n g; the11 it is even mo re i mpo n an r to exercise ca u ti o n when draw i n g

conclusions frorn an analysis that ignores both framing and uncertainty.
[n our e xpe ri m e nt, the decision '"as an alogo us t.o t h e gai n/loss gambles

studied

by

behavioral

decision

researchers. 1:1

whether to take the cha n ce i nvolved io c hoosi ng

Participants

to

considered

accepr an addi t i on al 30

sh eke ls . If they took the chance, they would either receive a ga i n (Lhe 30
shekels) or be subjec[ to a loss (a fine r haL would be greater than 30
shekels).

This gain/ loss research design sharply distinguishes our e x pe l'i rne n t
from

-12.
43.

prior hehavioral

SPP wpm note:

decision

researc h

on

com pl ian ce with

I H .tncl <�.<.companving- text: Htjmt I Hilt: 29.

Su 1\'lanlw\\' Rabin 8.: Richard H. Th;ller. r\numaltP:.:

Winter 2001

.

Risk

:\tJPI:5ion.

n orm s.

J. E<:o�.

PF.RSI'..

tt ��H (dbc.tt::.sing- the implin1tions ot �mall smkt·s ){ain/loss gamblt:s for th(' role

•

of ckcn:asing rn:trgn�<d utilitr of wt:alth to risk <nersion ) .
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ExperimenL'> i n prior research have been carefully designed so that decisions
are obviou ly and unambiguously rramed as in\'oh·in g- either a loss or a
gain."H This prior research has confirmed the gain/los. framing effect i n the
context of compliance with legal norms; namely, people are risk-preferring
when choosing among options that involve only lo ses and risk-avoiding
�c
when choosing among options that involve only gains. , \1\'hile important,
these findings are d i fficult w apply lO choices that pn."sem the possibility of
gains and losses-which we believe to bt> the case in vc1y many situation
involving the ch oic e to violate a legal norm. Indeed, the earlier research left
open the following verv i m portant question: When people face a decision
that presentS the possibility of either a gain or a los do they evaluate the
"gain'' and "loss·· outcomes separate!)'· so that the' are risk <1voiding with
respect w gain possibilities and risk preferring with res pect to loss
possibil ities, or do they evaluate the gains and lo ses toget her, so that their
risk aujcude depends on whether they perceive the sum of gains and losses
,

as positive or negative?
D.

RJ:.Sl il.TS

Table C summanzes the results. As described above, parllCipants were
a ked to choose lwtween option A (in which they stop with IS 40) and
option B ( i n which they ger an additional IS 30 but are su�jected to the
risk of incurring a fi ne) . The llumbers in table C denote the number of
times option B was chosen (i.e., the choice to take a risk). EYery participant
faced each combination with t h rct> different expected values. Given that
th e n.. were forty-four pan icipams, the maximum number of B c hoi ces is 132
in each box.

+·!.

For an •·xampk of thb I' J W of cxptTintt- 1 1 1 . set:

lnunparing taxp;l\·t-r <'OlllJ>liann· in ,.ittJ<IIion"

in

Ho111111t11) l:ffi'l'll, .llt/JJ'II note 7, ;.tl �H(i

which t l 1 e dt-ri�l<>ll 1u wkc an impn> JH'I

ckduniun product·� .1 l:11 g<·r rdnnd-and. thll�. ill\oives a g<llil-a" opp<"cd w �iLUation,. i n

"hich tht- d�·cisi•111 1 1 1 take a n impr opt•r dcduni•>n prvdrH t: S a sma lkr :1ddinonal tax pa�·nw•H
.tnd. thus. 111\'f)IW:-. a ,m,dlt·l J .J,s).

·G.

Jd. \'\'hcn tin JChng wlretll<"l ltJ take

,1

P""-'ibh ille!{al t,\x clc-rhtCllf rll in ,\11 l':!>.j>t:rinH·nt.d

siruaru•JJ. paniciparn, "·lur had h,rcl in!.utliciertl t.tx•·� wnhheld (and 1 hu;. would ha\t' I<> maktl.lr)!.<'t !.tX p;tl'lllt-111 tl lltf'l dtd not rake r l w cl.·clut 1mn)
Jlr;tn parnnp.tnl,. 1-!11 • h;ul t'l!Dll).\11

1.1-:e�

;1�

:1

ntorc· J ik,·h '" t<lke the dedurllcJII

willtlwld llt:n llwv \\'onld rerc·J\e .1 laX refund c·r!lwr

1\·;n . l'lw re,<'ardH·r' «m.-lurkd Jltat d w p.u ucipants
f1�tmc·d dw deu:-.1on

\\'t:fl'

1d1<1 1\tHrlcl 11,1\C' '" lll:tkl· ,, tax p.lllttel l l .

1 1 n·oking 0 1 l l k 1•>:-."·�. and rnade tht' ckcistoJ! 111 the· risk-prt·ft-rnng

JWtllllt'l 1ha1 pr o�p<·< 1 ilW•H\ IHH r l c l ,.,tgge-�1

111

the· r,·;dllt of lo�e'. Tlw p<tninpants ,,·hn wotdd

I <'< cJ\<· a rdn11d t<!llwr \\;1\ lr.mwd tltc.> dn J!>ion

;�,.

i l l\Clhing onh ga11h and thert ntade ilw

de< i:-11111 in 1lw n;.k ,1\c·J:-c nt.tllJH"r thai pr":.JWrl tlwon \\'otlld -<ugg<'-'1 i11 1hc realm ol gai11:. /tl
.11 !.ih-iX.
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T:\BLI:. C
COMI31

ED FREQUENCY

(OUT Of

OF B CHOICES
l:�2)

POSSIBLE

Slt.r: oF SA.\iCTIO!'\
C FR T .-\10:

RISJ-;\

UNC:ER r:\lN

St-�t

CERT:\1:'\ PROB.\BII.l fY

75 (56°'c· )

5� ( 40%)

<19 (37%)

1 77

Rt Sl\Y P1{0 F\,-\ f\ I ! . lTV

60 ( 45%)

+-1

(:�;{%)

:�8 (29%)

1 42

52 (�9%)

44 r��{ % >

� I (23%)

127

187

141

l l fl

LI K£ 1 . 1Hoou or DEn:cnoN

.
UNCERT -1.1!\: PROBABil.llY

SUM

Table C shows clearlv that the number a n d percentage of B choices
increases with the certainty of the fine and the certainty of the probability of
being caught. Thus, the experimem rtjectecl the null hypothesis in pan.
Participants were averse to uncertainty in both

anction and the probability

of detection. Indeed, comparing the certain/cenain cell of Table C with the
Jisk)1/risky and uncertain/uncertain cells. the results are quite striking,
particularly in light of the fac t that choice

B

always had a higher expected

value than choice A.
Tables 0, E. and

F

show the same data separately for each expected

value (Table · D, E. and F correspond to the 0. E, and F combinations in
Table

B).

Again, the general pauern remain:,, though the reversal of the

expected result in the shift from risky to lii iCertain probability in Table D
suggests (as the statistical analysis confirmed) that the difference between
the risky and uncertain combinations was less robust than the difference
between the certain and risky comhina(ions. 1''

46.

Although we cannot offer a ddiniti�·e explan.won for the reversal of the expected

result in Tabk D. two possibilities are as

folio,,·�-

Fi r�t. it i� possible that participants weiglm·d

the possihi l i ties in the ''uncertain" table usin� the-

u n known possibilities equally. This seem� unlik<:l)

13erncntllian

method of treating equallr

itt light of the robust results in other

experiments regarding ambi guity aversion aiiCI the fac t th.tt the expected result is ob!:ierved in

Table� E and F. Second. it is more likely that "'�' are nb�enin� a preference reversal in some of
the participantS at a
accompanying note

'27.

"bound al)'" in th<:
Recall that the

sense

di�<u�cd

snt"·a

Pan

w·as the product of the smallest chance of cit-tenion

sufml

text

60

5%

or

15%

in the "certain" cells

50 or 70 in the "risky" and " unce rtain " cells) . .-\s Rabin and Thaler have discussed,

subjects differ in their aversion lO risk

Ser

St'e

( I U% in the "cenain" cells and

in the "risky.. and " unce rtain " cells). and thc- l<u·gest possible line ( N J S

and !\IS

I I.B .

D ch oice� involved the h ighest expected value, which

Rabin & Thaler,

supm

across potential

note 43, at

losst:� of differen t sizes and probabilities.

22K It set'lll-' plausible that there might be di fferen 1

"boundarie5" fi11· 1·isky and uncenain ch()lce� i nvo lvi ng 1ui:-:ecl gain/loss olllcomes. This would
be a wonlty subject for funhcr rest'arclt.
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TABLE 0

FR£QUENCYOF B CHOICES (OUT OF44)

WITH

IS 24 4;

EXPECTED VALUE

SIZE OF SANCTION
CERTAI�

RISKY

UNCERTAI:--1

SLIM

CERTAIN PROBABIL11Y

37

26

29

92

RISKY PROBABILITY

30

26

22

78

UNC!::RTAJ

32

27

23

82

99

79

72

L I K E L I HOOD

OF DETECfiO;--J

1 PROBABILI1Y

SU�1

TABLE £

FREQUENCY OF B

CHOI CES

(OuT OF 44)

WITH EXPECTED VAJ.uE

IS 1 5

SIZE O F SANCTION

CERTAI N

R.r$J(Y

UNCF.RTAI!"\

St.: M

CERTAIN PROB.J\Bil .ITY

24

17

17

58

R.!Sh'Y PROBABII.ITY

24

14

9

47
32

L l KEUHOOD OF DETECTION

U >ICERTAJJ'\ PROBABTI.ITY
SL 'l\1

15

13

4

;)! )

44

30

TABLE

FREQUENC Y OF

WITH

f

B Cli()JCES (OUT OF 44)

EXPECTED VALliE

.

I}

7.5

SIZE OF SANCT IO!"\

Ll KEJ.IIiOOD OF DETF.CTIO:-.i
CERTA I. PROBABIIJ fY

CERTAIN

RISJ..'Y

L I N C E R TAI�

Sc ;-.1

]4

JO

3

27

RISJ.-1' PR08ABII .I'fY

6

4

7

J7

UNCERTAIN PR013ABIJ.JTI'

5

4

4

13

25

18

14

SL'M

Examining rhe data demons1rates t h a t both the level o f uncertainty ancl
rhe expected value of the deci ion appear to have made a difference in the

decisions. The m ore imponanr result for our purpo e . of course. was l h <"
effec t of uncen.ainry. The more nncenaim y associaLed with op t i on B. the ]e.,s
like!� panicipams "'ere w rh oose it. 1 n addirion, r h e higher t h e t"Xperwd

,·al ue of optio n B, t h e more like!) participanLs were to choose.: i t . A l t hough
this

Iauer

relationship

i�

ob,·inus

and

unsurpcising.

it

is nen·rrlwles�

di�nrsM·d regardill!-{ T;rbl<" B. 1\t> calculalt>d the t"X IW< ll""fl value ot l h t· ··uiiCt"l nun <llllll)ln,tlron� :1� lire nw.m •Jt 1lw 1wo po,,ibililit·'· SN• It"Xl att omp:nning \llf!m no1c :{�J.
47

A'

I 'LOO·I J
i m po n an t w the an<lh-;is of o u r resulrs bec:wse i t strungh ..;uggests th;n

pani('ipanr!'. LOok t ht·i t· decision seri<.H I"I�· and ant· m p t t>d

tn

make: rati<Hl<ll

c

l ec isi o 1 1 s .
'
V\'e submiued tht' dam to a two-way re pea te d ANOVA, ·' with one �anor
clisLingui · h i ng among the three le\·els of cenainty for the:- sanction. and
another r�1ct or distingui"l1ing among the three le\.els of ce na i n ry for tlw
probability 11f being caught. '\' We tind a significant dll"ct ol sanction
ccnai ntv ( F� -..=K.£1:1. pdl . CIO l ) . and a -;ignificam effect of' probabil it � c e na i nt\.
( F � , ...= l �).�2. pd J.O! J l ) . -.1,

a '\trong. signifi<:ant difference between the ('Crtain

There i

·a n ni o n

and the rwo uncertain ..,,111nions ( r i sk and uncenainrv) pooled together

( F , , , == 1 O.G2, pdl.() I ) a n d 01dy a marginall)' signifi('ant di ffere 1 1 C e between
risks sannions and unn.:nain sanctions <F�. � .=2.9, p=O. I 0 ) . The resu l t i ·
si m i l ar to1 the cenaint\' of the probability: namely, there i-; a strong,
s i gniti c a m difference between certain probabilities and the t\vO u ncertai n

p ro babi l ities poole d rogC'rher (F1 ,,=22 . 1 9, p<O.O l ) and only a m a rgina l ly

significant difference be r ,,·e e n risky and u ncertai n probabilitic ( F , ,.,=�3.:H,
p=0.07). Ove>rall. these findi1 1gs suggest that behavior is i 1 dluencecl by
certainty (both certainLy with re pect w the sa11crion and c erta i n ty with
respect lO the p robabi lity of detection), while Lhe d i ffe rence be twe e n risk
an d

uncenai 1 1 tv

under

the conditions we tested is smalkr and o n ly

marginally significant.

F.

'
'J X
I.V/'1�/U'REI>'. TrOt\' OF R
F...iUI.

.-\c co rcl ing

to our results, uncertainty with regard to eirher the size of a
st.ul c t i u n or the p robabi l i t) of detection increase cieterr('nce. To diffe ri11g
degn:::cs. these res u l ts pose a challenge to imerpretation in ligln of both
prospect thco1�' and expected utility theory.''' In the end, t ht> results can be

Al\:0\':\ (anahsi:; of' "arian('C') is a �uuistical tcchniqne dt'sigm·cl

4:-1.

diflerell<'(·s in

illt'.llb het\\'t'<'ll t'Xpt·rimcntal conditions are signilicanl

w

< heck \\'ht::thcr

( i t' .. ,,·hcther it is

reasonable 1o as
sume that there are n::al diff'crettccs i n the JXlpuhu i n u ) . or \\'ht·f hl·r one is abk
w

t·c:jen ,,·ith ronlidt·nct· tlw hypotlwsis that the mean.� are equal (i.e.. thai lltt' dif'lcreuccs wc

st·c .1rt> ju�t "11oise" iu th�: sa111ple).

4�.

.-\NOV.-\

t t' q u i res

a

Clllltinuous

dependem

variable.

As

out

nle,t;o,uremcnts

are

ratcguriutl (biiiM)'), we Slltllltll'cl tht' values of the lhrec:: differem ques1ion-; (expened values)

in each cell. and perl(mm·d .\NO\'A on the resulting measun·ment:.. ,\llc:n,ttilt.:lr, a LOGIT
regression anahsi� l(,r repl':ltl·d measures om be adopted. ·nti:. analvsi., i,- mott: complicated,

1111d therefon· 11111 reponed in c.letail.

evenheles
s we performed it, and thc results are
( '04,= 12.2, p<O.O I ) . pn,hahiliry ( ·:.,,=�9.6.

es.-...:mially 'unil:tr: 'ignilicant efi(:CL� of sanction

p<O.O I

:iO.

)

and expt>nccl 1·alur (

',,,=I O:Hi. p<O.O I ) , with

110 significant pair-\\·lst' tnh:t<tCtions.

Ttwrt· is 110 sigto iti!'allt interaction hetween tht:: cffeclS

( F,.,

.-O.X I ) . The lc,·el ol

Ct't taint)' in the sauc tion dolt'S not influence the magnitude of influrtH l' ol tht· cenaitHy of
pr<>babilit)', and

51.

'l<'t:

vt:r·sa.

Pr(>:ojX'CI tht>oo-y b tht> name giv�:: n

lO

the branch <>f behal'ior.tl decision research

as�ociat�c·d 1\'illt Kah lll'lllan .tud ' 1\l'r�ky. See .!,fi'TIPml�)' C:HOIU$.

�7.

Expt'ctt'd lllilitl

IIIC'OIV

\':\ 1.1 :Es. \ 11 FR.-\;\IE.'), ·'ufJm IIOte
is the name gi,·cn w the lraditiun,tl, non-lwlt.tli(or,tl .tpproach lO
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e n t i rely rcconcile ci with prospect theory. but onl) panialh ret o n c i led with
expected utili() theot;.
from cenain to 1 i-.k\ .,anction .

We discu s separate!) the tran ition
ri ky to uncertain

anction . certain to ri ky probabilitit''>.

and

risk�· to

uncenain probabilitie .

The Tmnsilion from
Table

Certain to R.skJ
i
Sanctions ( 1

). This transition increase

to 4. 2 to '>. ami

3

10

6 in

uncertaimy with regard to lo��es. Thu ,

consistcfll with the reflection effect observed in prospect t hcol\ rt·:-.carch, we
might

expect

prediction

pa rti cipan ts

to

be

risk-preferring.

made by one of us in

an

Jndct·d.

this

earlier a rticle.':.> Yt·t.

\,·as

the

ou r results

dc monst r<Hc risk aversion-the result that would be prcciictt•d b;. cxpecrcd
" :�
m i l i t y theory, ' which prospect theory research has dcmonstl a ted to be
;; ,
ddiricnt in important res pects. .
The apparent contradicrion can be resolved through t i lt· recognition
that the B o pti o ns in our experiment involved gains a

wc..:l l as lo<;scs, and

that the potential for gain consistently outweighed the pot e n t ial fot· los. .
Pt ior cxpcrimelllal re-earch on com pl ia n ce with legal not n t " was carefully
ron truned so that there we re no mixed gain/lo
researche r

the

found .

con i tent

with

the

option-,. ' In t h a t co n t ext,
g-<.tin/lo:-.:--

It .11ning

dTt'ct

expl ai ned b� pro pect theory. that pa rt i ci pan t!) were ri:-.1-..-p• t�krring \,·hen
options in\'Ohed onI) los.es and ri 1-.-a\'oiding when option-. i m olq:d onl�
gain·.

B\

contrast, our expe1iment pre emed th<:' mo1 e

t om pi<·:-. (and

rt"al istic) ·ituation in which both gains and losse· a t e po..,-.i))k < H llcomes of
the "iolat ion of a legal nom1.
Thi. design raist>d thl" que Lion whethe• participant" wnttld frame tht·
lo

and gain po sibilities separately-beha\'ing in a ri.:;k-ptl'kt ring manner

with

regard to u nce nai nty over lo

se

and a ri�k-m·oiding mannl'l

\\'ith

regard to uncertainty O\'er gains-or whether the p<lnicip;lllt. \\ O t tld frame
""
the losse· and gains together. The ::;trong pattern of risk an:r..;ion sugg(·sts
that t h e pa rtic i pan ts framed the sanction, not as a lo�::.. b u t rat her as a
t"\, lllOilHC and o1h.:r rauon.d dtotre approat he.·'>. Fot .111 appltc ..tltoll ol <"'P''t tnl util111 1 heon.
't'e P()ltn�\..v & Slt;l\·ell. llljnn lltll<' !l.
'l2
.\u Hart'! & . eg<tl. \1/fll"ll nott' .'. ,tt 291-:"09 (min){ P""J><'l 1 tlto••tn to .u gnt· thai
(l lJillll<tl� \\l)lt(d prd<·J' lllHI"I I,\Ill j)Uill�hlllt:ll\.:>).

-,:�

.')u• Polin!>\..\ & 'ltil\l'll. Sllj>lil noll' :,. •ll X� I (dhc ll"lllg tht' fl•l.tlfl>lhhtp ht:l\\t'l'll lllilill"

1 hn1r' .lllcl
-,4

" '"

.1wrsion)

\u' \1.111 h·-" Rabm. f)lll/1111\lllllg ,\lmgnwl { IIIII\ "/ II 11tlth ( "tllllwl I 'I''""' N"k :\;•, ntoll. 111
( .IICliC ' " \ \I l l "· ''n FR.>.\Ih. 111jntt not<' :li. al �02. 21l:'t-07 !.H�lllll� 1h.11 , .._pt·c wd 111iltl\
·
•

tlwon produ<<'' ullsle.tdlll!! • o1H lu�ion� ,,·Jwn "'"Jll.titllll)! -,uh,t.lllll.tl n,\.. .1\t"I'HHI- 1 1 1 th.
t nnte" ol ptt'Oilllll\! -,illll.ll t t'k IH-lliLtlil\ -,_ \Jll<l' TH"I'"' ,\: n.uud \,,ollllo•llJ.Ill. \dt•t/1/lr\ Ill
PICJljJI·rt tlnon ( "umulliltl·t Htflli"lltn/ltlll uj l "lln11atlll\. 111 ( I I I li! I ..,, \ \l l ' " \'II FK.\�11 '· \II/JIII
lltllt' 'li ,tl -I I (llelllllj.{ th.tt prn�p•·(l lht·ot"\ h..t' t''pl.ltlll'cl tJ w tll.IJOI \tlll.lti•Hl' of <"'JII'C It'd
IIIIIII\ tht"llf\)
:15

fih.

J>11111l

\11• \llj)lfl lt'XI .In omp.tll\ I l l � IH)ft• -J-1

\\o• ,Ill' gt,llt'lll( Ill \11 l .tlJ.H h l01 dhC \h.,l<lll' tlJ.tl ,h.liJHIWd tHII .tp(ll•'< l.lll<l!l llf tl11�

�9 !OW-\

-H)(i

ronl p u t l c t l t oL t bettdit . It apJJ<:ars th.u

tht·

I.A \ V RJTIC\\'

l �<HH I

participa n t s did not eval uart· the

-;a nnion i n isc>l<Hioll . but rather in conjunction with t he benetit cleriv(""cl
from 111aking t h e ri�k\· choice. fu other words. i n deciding whether Lo choose
OJ)tion �- the panicipants discounted rhe ,·al uc of the additional

acr o t cling

30

!:>hekt>ls

rhe chanc(' of being caught and fined. Th<:' n10re certain they

lt>

could he a b o l l ( the chance of being caught and fined. the more cerr<.lin the'
could be about the gain from option 13. I n this way. the participants appear
to han· fnunecl option

B as pre e mi ng t h e possi b i l i l"v of· a gaiu. with £1w

resu l t i ng ri-;k averse hehavior that prospen theory predins with regard w
crai ns. - or course. more re earch is necessarv hefore drawing s u-ong�
0

" -"

conclu-;iorls regarding the fra ming of such gain/ loss decisions.

ThP Tmnsitio-n from Risky fo Unurtaiu Sanclwns

(4

to

7, 5

to t , a n d 6 to 9

in Ta b l e .-\ ) . I n co111rast, this transition can be easily explained. The resull"S
here rdkct ambiguity aversion-a well -documented preference for known
",;

ov c· t t i l l known probabili ties.

"/'he Transition from Certain

lo

Risky Probabilitif.s

to

(1

2, 4 to 5,

and

7

to 8

in Table A ) . The detenem effect of the tran ition from certai n LO risk}'
probabili ti<>s of detection is the experimenral result that is most inconsistent
"\!
wi£11 the expected u t i l i ty analysis.
Prior work i n economics has taken risk
a\'e rsi o n i n t o account; risk aversion ma: explain the preference for certain
sancriom m·er 1·isk)' sanctions (because there i

l l 11< .1:-pect of our results has

":•I.

to

be considerc-d

;1

a broader range of anction

�omewht�t

\\"t:<tk finding bec.lll�t· it b

po<sthl<' th.lt rht· partic i pan ts collapsed the in itial g-rant ol •10 sht:kcls imo rhe chance to gc-t an

additull!id :�0 and. thus, treated all Lhc possi ble;: outcome� a:, gain�. notwith!-tanding t1ur dl"on :.
1o

IJanat· tht· B opti on as a )!;ain/loss gamble. In <>tlkr

chotn· ht:t\HTI\ .-\ and B, nCJt

a.�

"'(>rds,

\,·e framed it (i.e .. bet\,eC:"Il

the}" 111ay h<t\'(" t'Valu<llecl the

(:\) .. keeping'"

-1-0 slu::keb ;and ( H )

"g-t·ning·· .tn .additional 30 shekels). b u t rather a s a t h oin: he;:t\,·etn (A) ··!{etting" -10 shC:"kc:-ls and
( I ) ) --g�·tting .. a less certain amonnt thal would be no more than 70 :. l te kels and no le�� t han X

�h t·kt· l'

( "·itl• X being a di fferent amount in each rn11ncl of rhc <.:xpcrimt·tlt) . I n otl lc.:r ,,·orcb. it
i-. po��i hk that t he}· n:framed a two step pr(Jcess consisting of an initial grant of ntotwy and a

���b�t:C(llt"lll g.dn/I(JSS decision into a one step . pure �.1in cleci�io n . We are inc lined
thts (l<"'tbilm

panidp.11tl'- ,l(ct:pl t he frame that they an.: offert-d. Srr Daniel Kahneman.
\'.\t.t

h.

111 cl iscoun 1

because bella,·ioral decision research s1rong-ly suppons the hn)o th esis rhat

\='l> FR·\�1!-:S, suj>m note

27. at

"'

f'r1'{arl'. in CHOICES.

("[D ]ecision makers are general!) q ui te pas�in• ancl

t ht·t do a e inclined tO accept any fr<�mt: to wh ich they an:: cxpost:d."). As sh own

in�trlllttoaa� 111 this Article's Appen dix . the participa n ts wen· told:

\1 tht• beginning or each round you will he giH·n 40 NIS. Tht:n you \,·ill be asked
, hon'l' ht"t\,·een two alternatives:

Al te mati ve

A or al terna t i,·e

in

the

to

B. The decision will he

u • t Himted b�- cl icki ng a button with the nwu:>t". If yma c hoo:,e A \Oil "·ill keep tht"

40 '\II'> and the round will end. I f you choost- R vou will bt' gi,en a n extra Y �IS.
l>ut you wil l

nm

the ri�k of being caught and required tO pay a fine. In this case

\C ill I,·J!I h<a,·e lO return n10ney to the cxperimcntt::r.

\1•1' rtt/111 \p1>ntdix. This rrarn in g issue remai n s to be explored in sub�equent research.
:lX

'>l't' (/tpm

."'l'l

\·\\·

Me:

text

accompanying note 18. Su gt'nrrrtlZv Buclescu .

�upra note 29.

grmefu l for di�cu�ions \,·•th Oren Bargil l , Robert Bones aud

Stephe n .\l;1rk.�.

tt tel n >t tt'�(l• nadenet:: with Peter Siegelma n that im pruvL'cl ntu gaasp or this potnt.

•
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i n the risky case), but i t cannot explain the preference for greater r c r ta i nt\
;
with regard to the probability of detection! n
I n creasing uncertainty about

the probability of detection doe-s nor

increase the range of sanctions or, ex ante, the chance of detection. Before
rolling r h e ten-sided die that determines the probability of detection, an
individual c hoosing B in our "risky'. cell
of detection as an individual choosing

face

B

exactly the same probab i l i tv

i n our "certain" cells. Thus th1-·

s h i fts in the results that occur i n moving from the "certain" detection 10 tlw
"risky" detection cells are

results

that cannot be explained

'"

ri rhi n t l w

traditional expected utility fram<:'\\lork.
Another way of emphasizing t h e potential significance of our det cninn
finding is that prior theoretical analysis i m proved on the expectec! utilit\
approach by recognizing that, because of risk aversion, individuals· bt>ha,·ior
is no! dictated solely by the expected value of the

anction."1 U ncenaint,·

with respect to the size of t h e sanction makes a difference because or risk
aversio n . Our analysis makes a f11rther i m provement by recogn izing t h a t
individuals· behavior n'la)' also differ ")' tematically from expccred ,·alu<"
when there is uncenainry over the probability of detection.

The Transition from Risky to Un rerto in Probabilities
i n Table

A).

(2

to 3,

5

to 6. and 8 to
" risk

The i n c reased dererrt"nt effect of moving from

9

� ·· to

"uncertain" is more consistem ,,-ith expected ut i lity analysis becwsc one
.

cannot with confidence state that the ·'expected value'' in the . risk'·· anc!
.
. uncertain" cells i equivalent. The expected value is dependent upo11 the
"'ay that the louery is conducted i n t h e "uncertain" cells, and we did not tell
our participants anyth ing about how that

lottery would be ronduct<"cl.

Moreover. a noted in COI1nection with the t ransition from 1iskv to tmct>nain
sanctions, prior research on ambiguity '"ould predict that individuals wottld
be more reh.1ctan1 to tOlerate unknown probabi lities of rhis type than known
fl�

one .

The importance of attitudes toward risk sugge ts a further rc.
.. ason for
caution i n generalizing from our results. There are findings that s11ggest th<tt

risks,
uch a:. small
m
mon etary losses. differs from the attitudes to large risks.
As a resul t . one
the degree of risk-tolerance with

liO.

.'in Polinsk� & Sln\,·cll.

�11/Jm

1W1l' :) .

respect

to small

\'\·c w1itc -mav t>xplain,'· brc:ua<>e . 1 rani{<' p• o,·idt"'

it.; midpoilll l)lth af l ht' rt" i� a <.kclining margin.-tl utilit� <ll llllllW\ anrl. a�
i\tal!ht ,,· Rabin ha" onrlu�i,·cly clt:mun:-trt�rccl. 1lw declining m;1rgiu;tl Ulilit: of llltlll<"' ··annol
·
l·x plain n�k ,�,·<-rsion in rkci;,ions m ,·oh, ng :;ul h small anH)Ilnts of morH·�. s,.,, R.d1111. '11/'m nolt'
.
:1-1. .tt �()� ( t
�: planu ng th:\1 the ... i,k ;1\crsiun.. t)b,wnecl 111 bdlotllnral d,,,. l,..lnll .,.,..,.,lit h 1"
..
.
,mrilnnahlt" 1o "los-. <ll·<·r,..H III.. not to ala· dr·di11111g IH:.rginal utdil\ of 111on<''·).
mort> del\"11<'11<"<' th.111
•

Ill

.),•,

gp111'1flll\' Pnlirbk\ &: Sh<11·t'll. 'IIJnn lllllt' ;l. �l·t• fll10

It')'; I (prmrrling .Hiciiliunal <llllhOI;l'· supporting

62.
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fi:-\

.\rt Rabm 8.: I haler.

t>l\ph1 i 1 1 t l w 1"1'\t'l ,.1l 1 n

llt/Jift null·

111jlm ll<HI' 1 6

.uHI .111 tllllj).lll\JIIg

1hb. j)lllj)t>Si l i t m ) .
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· r ahk D. \1'1• '"I'm 1c'1 ·'' r ompannng 11e •w 4:'>.

dlh

m:t\

��� 10\ \j\ / . \ I \ Hf.T IF\ I.

-HiH

.·

"

l �W0-1 1

C<lll l l l l l liglnly gt·twt·alizc r l l<:> re-sults �·ro11 1 behavior i11Volving slllall -;takes to
bt'll<n i ( l r it1voking largt· gambles. As l11v'W C<HI[ions makt" clc<lr. we do t l t ll
claim r h a t our research clncl anal�'sis arc c o n c l u · ivc with re-;pe-cr LO the effecL'i

o f tlncenaim�-

Rather.

wr

highlight

the

i m portance and

l t' le,·anc-e

of'

uncenai n c>· a n d begin lO explore the h·ays unccnainry c o 1 1 l d be mani pulated
to

reduce

the costs or operating the kgal system without

reducing its

deterrent effects. Toward that end, the next Parr anal�?.es rhe tre-atment of
U t lce:nainty i n ton and criminal Ia''' and -;uggcsts ways rhat policy makers
could use uncertainLy to i ncrease deterrence.

llT. L:\CF.RT:\1!\!TY 101 CRI�liN.-\1. .-\i\D TORT L\\\'
Our

experi m e n tal

results

suggest

that

uncerrainry

in

sanctioning

in creases deterrence, at lt>ast w i t h i n the conditions that we i t1\'Cstigated. I n
this Pan, we acldre s the treatment of tmcenainry under exi ·ting ton and
crirninal law, begi nning with the anomal}' that we noted in the introduction:
namelv, that criminal and ron law borh attempt ro reduce uncertainty with
respect to the si;.c

o f the

sanction

and

largely

ignore

uncertainty

in

detection. This anornal;; reflects a discernible legal ethos that, nevertheless,
leaves

ubstantial

room

for

policy

possibilities of uncenainrv ("\·en i n

makers

to

exploit

the

deterrent

euing sanction .

Cl-i m i n a l law d i ffere ntiates sharply between certainry with respect to the
size or the sannion and cenainry with respect to the probab i l i t)' of detection.
Criminal law has mechanism-; designed to i n c rease certainty with respect tO
the size of the sannion. bttt i t typically does not regulate certainty with
respect to the probabilitv <>f detection.

1.

Uncenaimy Regarding Sanction i n Criminal Law

There are many rules i n criminal law that are explicitly designed tO
address uncertainty with respect to the size of a sanction. These rules follow
in part from the fundamental principle that an individual i entitled to know
in advance the content of criminal prohibitions as well as the sanctions for
violating them. The prohibition on
sanctions pro,'icle

retroactive changes i n

the criminal

a paradigmatic example. Imernational documents, such

as Seetion 1 1 ( 2 ) of the Uni,·crsal Declaration of Human Rights and Section

7( I

) of the European C<Hl\'t'Jnion of HU!nan Rights, prohibit rhe i m position

of retroactive sanction

for new offe nses, or retroacti,·ely i ncreasing the

sanctions for existing offenses.

irnilar provisions can be found i n numerous

constitutions, including in Article I, Sections
Constinaion, Article

10:�(2)

9

and LO of the U n i ted States

of the German Constiwtion, and i n Section
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1 1 (g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."'' A n·'lat<"d principle

of c•·iminal law-the p•·i n c ipl e of lenity-also increases th<' certainty of the
CJi minal sanction.

Accordin g

to the principle of l e n i ry, a criminal statute

must be strictly construed and any doubt regarding tl1e size of the anction
1;;
must be resolved in favo•· of the defendam. , Finally, one of the stated

objectives of the Model Penal Code has been "to give fai r warning of the
61;
natUJ·e of me sentences that may be imposed on convinion of an offense.'.
This objective was a ce-mral reason for t h e move i n t h e U n i ted

tates toward

determinate sentencing exemplified by tl1e adoption of detailed sentencing
m
guidelines. To sum up. i t seems that in Western legal systems. certainty i n

64.

These provisions f.>n>hihn bor l i tlw I'Ciroanive imposition of llt>l\' prohibitions and the

65.

U ni ted States v. Wiltlx·rger. I � LS. 76, 95 ( ll:l20). I n sonH:jurisdinions. the CC)JnlliOll

rc1roactive inneasc· in the sanc1ion. Our Article dc;tls only with the lam·r a�ptxt.
lt�w rule of strict construction has been mcl ifit-d.
(4The provisions of thi� cod!' .

.\1'(• FL-\. STAT. Al'N. !:i 77:1.021 ( I )

{West 2002)

. . �h.�llbr srl'iclly const rued; when dw language is )>II�Ct'plible of

different consu1.1ctions it shall h,- co nstnred mos1 favor<'tbl)' to the accused."). llw rule of kni1 1·

is often justified on 1 h e gmund� thai C i tizens have a 1·ight to be tJoti !led of tht' content of
criminal

as thc �i�;c of 1he sanctions i m posed

wdl

prohibitions a:.

pmhihitions. SrP Liparma '. llnm·cl Statt>s. 4 7 1 U.S. -1 1 9 .

for \'iohllinK tht'!ie

427 ( 19g:>): Uniu·d Stat('s ,.. J3a.,�. 40-1

U.S. :·t)6, 347-4R ( 1 9 7 1 1 . Fot· a discus.-;ion of the rule of lenity, �e�· 1-{t'IWralh Dan M . .Kahan.

I.Puily and /·prfnal r
:ommrm !.aw C:mn1·1.
66.

I �19-1 Sl

1'. CJ . RE\·. :�-1:1 ( 19�H).

�10D�L PE�At . 0 li)F !:i I .O:?tl) C d ) ( 1 962).
S
r r ROt;F.R W. I I \l:'<h F'l -\I

67.

.•

FF.I)F.RAL SE:-.TENCI.\1<: GLIIDEI I 'iES

H.\:--: DnOOJ.: 1-2 ( 199�).

MICI IAEI. TOt-:RV, St-: TF!'\1 :1�1. !\1.\'n ERS 1 (I ( 1 996). Tlw L'.S. Sen t enci ng ( :omn1ission i1sdf (tlw

com1 n ission that i:-. in chargt· . .r drafting tht' sentencing guiddines) t'l n phasl lt'd tht' i mponann·
of cenainry. ln explai n i ng i1.-< rlbjt-niws. it stt�t�d th:-u: "A sentencing �ysH·m 1:ri l on·cl 1o fit t''t·n

ronct>i,·t�ble wrinkle of t·ach c<��t· "·oulcl quickly hec0111<' ur1Wt1rkablt· and :-.t·riou!'ly conrpmmist·

tilt' certainty of pu nishntcl l l .llld ib cklcl t t•nt etT..-ct.'' .\1•1' U.S. SENTE:'\1'1�<: CO:>IM ., . FEOER.-\1.
ENTF.:-<t:l'lt:

MM-Ill:\1

p1.

I

ch.

,\_:)

( I !J�J:"i).

(llloiloh/r a/ hr tp://l'"''''.tL'i..�C.)to\'/ I Y9!'iguid

GU I OETt\B. HTM. Yt•L otl1ct 1 <Ji< <'-" ha,·c ;a rgu ed t hal the pri m ary aim of :;t>n t..-ncm g guicklhw�
is not to promote cenaittt�· b t l l ttl rt>diiCt' diSf.><llity in St'lll<"ncing. EciH><-s 1o this vic"· can also lw
found in the- sentencing gtuckluw.s m anual which staH's that 0111' of' tht' .. thret> ol�jccti\(·s
Congress sought to achielt· 1 1 1 <'llacting th� Semcnring Rdorm Act ol

19X-l" wa� ·n·;lsonablt

uniformity 1 1 1 st'nltHCittg )),· l l:l iTl l\\'1 111-\' 1hr ,,•ide disparitv in st-tll<.:llf't'S i m posnl for similar
criminal oflense commancd b" similar ollt-nders." !d.
Tht"�c two o�ji'C'ti\1·:-

.Ill:' distinn .

samt" linw m.tilllain di�p:u m

It i:- pos.�ibk '" have C<'nai n '"'H dons. :t11cl

amo ng different

i ncli11d uab.

II

i nd i 1i d ua l A

:1\

llw

kn<Ms that If

convinerl ht will be s<·n l t'll <' t>d In X wars in prison and indidd 11al H knows 1l1at if �lw '"

convicrc-d �h<' "·ill b<' St·nten• cd to Y. t lwn th<." s<tnction� art' ··cenain� and I t-t til.- S\'Str·m

m�tin�;tinl' d1�paritY. \t·t. dH·"· ,,,." 11b)'•(lin·s ( rt"naintl' on tlw <lnt• h.tnd .uHI c·lintin:rnng
disparit\ on the <>llwr lt.tnd 1

;�rc•

oftc·n llltt'rdqwndent. fht· Sc:nlC·tJCing R.-lorm .-\1 1 of I �):--i- 1

r('cognil.t'�< i l u s J nt(•rdqWtldc·nce :tncl 111 <-l l l ions bo1h of 1hc·m 1ugc1llt'r "" pru na rY obj n·tiiT,..

Tlw U .S. C:oclc· r\n notawcl
fainwss

rn

m ee1 in g

1 Ill'

;.uH·,.

1h:u

Oil('

ptu p• >-'l'S of

of 1he ol�J<'< l i n·s uf dw .\< 1 '" 10 ··prm ick rca taint\ :llld
�<·IHenring.

I h1 l

aHlldtng

disparili•·s .nnong d<·ft>nclaltl� 1\ith "int i lar records whn ltaH· bt·t•u

Cllllllll<tl <OI I dl lrt ." 1B l ' .�.< ...\. ;:i �)�II ( h ) ( l l ( B l (\<\'•·�t

nnw:n t.llllc•cl

M'nl<'ll < mg

lottnd gu i l t\ qf �i mi l:n

200�).

Th,·rc· '" ol rour�.- a --.·p:rratc• da�pul<' a� to 1\'ht-dwa dtt· s.·ntenc tng g ni dd irw� ntdc·•·d

acltwn· 1hc· goals !Ia'I .11111 :11 .whi c•1ing.

'll/JIYJ

now �o. :11

1 04--12.

I

.)1'1' SPill I�. '11/JIo not•·

�II. : 1 1 :z:J,t •-:\• 1;

�

1 I l l I �- ( : \IlK \:-.1 :-..

)Jic• i t l l <'rc·�nng fi nding 1lt:11 r�ri,.es donb1" :thtHII llw ,11, ...,,,.,. of tlw
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;.;e:- n ten c in g i:-. considered an i m ponan t oqjec ti ,·e and t t umerous doctrines
atT desi g ned to ac h ieve that certainty.

2.
do

\'\'e

Uncertainty Rega rdi ng Detection i n Criminal Law
not

observe

the

sam e

atten ti o n

ro

reducing

unce-rta in ty

regarding the probability of detection in criminal law. In large pan, this may
lw a t t ri bu tab le to ins ti tu tio nal fac tors . Th e c r im i n a l j ust i ce s yste m se para tes
itts titutiona l rcspon s ibi l iry for different aspects of the d e r:ec tion of criminal
Police

aCI'\.

and

o th er

law enforcement

agencies

are

resp onsible

for

surveillance and ar res t; prosecutors are resp o n s ible for decid i n g whether

and hmv to p rosecute ; and judges and j u ries are responsible for d ecidi n g
,,·hether the evidence is sufficient to convic t . While overly sim pl istic,''� this
de- sc ri p ti o n highlights t h e faCL that a variety of instiwtions a re involved in

deteCLing crime and that, while courts are h ardly peripheral to the detection
process,

th ey do

not play as central

role

in

de tect i on as they do

in

sentencing. This lesser role of courts is i m portan t because, in ge ne ral , the

rnore removed an actor is fro m the inside of a courtroom, t he less t he le ga l
system tends to constrain action. Thus, as a matter of institutional re ality ,
<"enainty in de tecti o n will tend ro be affected more by

"

po licy" than "law"

(re c ogn iz i n g that we are drawi ng to some degree an ar t ific i al distinction ) , at
least as com pared to certai nty i n sa nni o n .
The existence of agenc ies specifically responsi b le for detec t i ng crime

makes i t possible for the criminal

j ustice

system to address explicitly the

public's perception of the cenainty of detec t io n in a way that, at le ast
po ten tial ly, distinguishes criminal law from tort law. It is our i m p ression,
however, thar, on the whole, Ja,., enforcement agencie s ' deterrence strategy
focuses more o n

( i n creasi ng)

the p robabi l i ty of detection than on the

certa i n ty of the probability of det:enion. Thus,

the efforts

invested

in

gene rat i n g ce rta in t y with respect to the size of the sanction are not matched

by similar efforts to address certa i n ty with respect to the p ro bab i l i ty of
detection. The former climension-cenainty "vith respect to the size of the
sannion-falls wi t h in the ambit of con ce rns about the "rule of l aw ,·· while
the latter dimension is mere ly a matter of "policy." Wh i l e this di fferential
treatmem of ce rtai n ty with

respect to these two dimensions may seem

natural to so me and puzzling to others, all would agree that the lack of

c ertainty "vi th respect to the pm babi li ty of detec tion receives little or no
auemion.

t'll�aging in more pre-charging charge bargaining. See Ahmed E.ssam Taha. The Elfens or the

Federal

Sentencing

Guidelines

on

the

Disposition

of Criminal

Ca:;es

100-0:�

( unp11hlished Ph. D. clissenation. Deparunem of Economics of Stanforcl Un i,·ersi ty)
with the Iowa Law Review).
68.

( 1996)

(on file

Prosecutors are in lacr often involvecl in surveillance and arres1 and, t h rough plea

IMrgaining, they ran also hecome- judge- ami

jury
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Manipularjng Unccnainry i n Criminal Law

that we

are

suggesting

that

policymakers

should

consider

mani p ulating cenainty in order to increa. e deterrence, the onus is on us ro
demonstrate that this is possible. Hence, in this section '"e \viii suggest some
ways in which certainty in sanction size and detection can be manipulated
6Y
\·Vithout subverting legal doctrine, or betraying the legal ethos.

Sanction

Si.ze. Criminal law often aurho1izes officials to u e their

discretion in setting sanctions. How official· use thi

discretion can increase

or decrease cerrainty with respect to the size of the legal sanction. Although
determinate sentencing reduces the discretion of judges, it does not reduce
the discretion of police and prosecutOrs. Most notably, prosecutors retain
'''
In addition, broad grants of

discretion to charge offenses up or down.

federal criminal jurisdiction in the Uni1ecl States can expose defendants who
commit identical crimes to disparate sentences depending on wherhe1· they

69.

V.1lile this senion focust>s on the cenaint" uf the sanc1ion and the precision of 1he

prl)babilil) 11f de1ec•ion, what b u h imatelv cr-ucial foJ de1nrence is not cenairll\ itself but tlw
belief,. ol pot<.:Jltial criminals regarding ccnaintl. Y.:l, "�'Luning that tlwre is a Cl)n·el;uinn
betWCC'II ((
.. rtainty and beliefs of potenlial crimi11<ll!-- "ith n·�peCl to <'ertaint)', this section focu�t·:
nn tht' lllechanisms for manipula•ing certaintY.

In addition to manipulating belit·fs t<>ncerning the C<.:naintr of tht· sanction and
bdit:ls concerning the precision of the pmbahilitl' of clt'tection. the legal systetn can al��'
manipulat.- the beli.:fs concerning 1he a1·erage :.iL<' of the s::mnion and the average probabili11
of det<:<'tion. In a classic anide. Meir Uan-Coh.-n ar-g-uecl that tlw leg-al SI"Stem nmtain� t\\'U
�epara1e v�tems

of norms: une acldn.:s:.t-d

to

lht' rriminab and tht· :.t'Cond addres:-.�·d tu judg{·:..

\'lcir Dan-Cuh<>n. 01rision Rull'� ond r.ondttd Hu/1''
H:\R\'. L. RF\'. 625

of nurm

( 1 9H4}.

Under his
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,;e"·,judgt'' upt"ralt' a more knient and forgi1ing S\'�tt·m

than those that are bclk1·ed bY the public '" guide jtJdicial dt-cbions. Au -acou:;Ji,

separation" bet\\·een these tWl> :,y:-rt'lll� of 111)1 nt� ){U.tr..tnl<'t-:. thai llw norm� 11·hich an: aclltall1
oper;�le:-d by junges will not be 1he ones knmvn to tht' public a1 large.

A

similar ;.chemt" coulrl

ptThaps lw established ll'ith respt-Cl to the probabili1y of detection. The police could create
"acoustic separation"

between

the anual

prob<�bility

of dctt'rtion

and

the belief

or •he

probabilirl' of de-Jection used by indi,·iduals to guide their behal'iOr. In other wot·ds, dte police·

could 111anipulate a false belief 1hat llw rate of deH"rllon i much higher than i1 b i n realit1.

So111e advocates or behal'ioral la11· anci eronomic� hal'e suggested wavs to creal<' Jabl·

belief.� concerning the probability of deteni<Jn. i\'lon· specifically, .it was

poimcd out th.tl

inciividttab tend ll) j11dge tht' l ikt·lihood or lii\Ct'rtain l'l't'llL� ( \IC'h as gcuing c:lllglll altl'l' tht·
commb.sion of a

n

inw) by h0\1' <tl'ailabit' such in'>tdnrt·s are to 1he hum.:�n minci. Thi:- an.th·!-.i.'-

uggest.s 1he dt·sif<lhilil\. from a prl'srriptil'e s1andpoim. of making l<11, enfc>tTt>ITll'lll highh'

1·i�iblt·

..tnci

thert>b\

creating

fabl" lwliet� ll'illl n·�p�"n

to

1he

probabilill' nf dc:�t·rtion

Con!-.equellll'. i1 \1';\� daimc-d thai 1he practice nl .. ,ticking large. brighth-colnred tickt'l!'- 1h.11

n·ad '\'10L-\TIOI'\' in large lencrs nn the dri,t'r�· 'id<·

ll'ind•J\1', where the1 art· patticul,uh'

IHHic··abll" 111 rlrin'r� pa);sin)!; b1·.- ts bcllt"r th;m the k!'� costly approach ("p11t1111g .-,m:lll. plt�in

licket:- ttndet llw ll'tnd�htcld ll'iper c1n 1hc: curh :-.ich· ol 1he �•ret·t, a piJre th:lt 1' 1 ollll'tllt'lll ft�t
tlw pa1 king •>lflcet

10

reac-h '' )

Chn-,line Jolls t-1 t�l.. A BPIUiliiOml AjJJnvnrh tn l.m• n n d F
.11momn,.

5U S'l ·\:--:. L. Rl-T. 1 - ! 7 1 . 1 538 ( l <J98) . .JutlgL' Posnet COIIIHert>d that til<' large stick<·• mil� haw 1 h e
nppo-,i le d f't.>Ct b y drJwing attCtllinn to lHJ\\' llllt t'C]IIt•lltly d1·H•ni<1n anually •H < ur:. Ru·h:11 d
p,,�f \ 1:' 1 . Natiounl C:hout', Belunlfma( l:tlllllillllr.\, (11/f/ tlu· l.uw. :'10 S'IA:--:.
71l.

1..

Rl· \'. 1 � :'> 1 . ) -,;,:\ t l!l�li'l .

Thi:. )JVII('t i' ust-<.1 •>!It'll 111 <'l':tde Ihi" �t'lll<"IH iug guidl"litw�. .�'''' C!·t.lld

\'\' H1·.ttw1.

l?n•tl!lill_t! f>ll/111111\ /Mmi/IIJ!. (;tmfrlllul ''11'11/1'1/Uif,l!.. ��� ·\ �1 ( .1�1.\1 1.. Rl-\ . 771. 77� t l 'l�l�l

[�OO·l l
arc pm-;vnlled b}· t h e slate or by the l'ed<.T,d );O\Trll lHetlt. \1\'ht·t t Rudolph
( ;iuli<Jni was tlw U n i ted State�

:

\uorne�·

in .

<.'W

York. hf' used tlw cunrutTetH

ju ri�din io t l to create a se t nen cing lonery. Hi.s pla n invoked a J.Jrogram i t t
which o n e clay was chosen a t random each week when a l l street l evel drug
dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prosecuted in federal
courr and cons<.:quentl; "ubjt""C ted to han;her sanctions. Ruclolph Giuliani
c·xplicilly t'tnbrarcd t he dctcrre t l l pos<;iiJiliries of <;t·mencing lotteries ,,·hen
71
he .slated: "the idea was to cre;tle a Russian roulette effect. "
L.cgal ducrr·ine can abo i ncrease or clecrea c cenaitH\. For example. i f
sanctions

are

for

smaller

attempts

than

completed

crimes,

there

is

u t t C<:'I'Laimy, ex ante, wil11 respect to the size of the sanction. vVhen a person
stans com1nining a crilllt', si t<.· cannot know in advance whether the crime
·

will be completed successfully or not. Thus, she faces a "s('ntencing lottery·

of o;ort s. 7� Similarly, "entenccs sometimes depend on the degree of ·uccess of
the

person

in

commiuing

the

crime.

Some

penal

prm�sions

i m pose

diffcremial sanctions i n accordance with the amount of money or property
stolen or other factor
the

crime

is

unknown to the perpetrator of the crime at the time
7•1
Finally, the "Pinkerton rule," \Vhich makes

co m rn i t tecl.

criminals liable for t.h e ans of their co-conspirators. similarly i mposes a
sanction according to l�tctors that are not known LO the perpetrator at the
t i m e the crime is rom m i ned. More panicularly, each co-co nspirator bears
"
the ri k thm other co-conspirators will commit further un plan ned crimes.
These

rules

are

considered

often

to

leave

the

fate

of offenders

to

contingencies that are bevond their powers and therefore are considered
.

Ul�JUSL

71.

;r.

Sat�t Bt><tle.

Too Mnu\

Crimejuri.1dir1ion. -l(i 1-l.·\..'i !

7'2.

nud 'lim hw: ,VntJ fJI.inripll'.�

I t--:< ::-. l..f. 979, 1000 ( l!:J95}.

A si m pl e c::xampk

t .ln

to

DPjinl'

lhl' J>ropn

l.imiB

for Fi·de-ral

i l l uMrate how a leg:.tl S)'Stt:m can manipulate c::enain t)' by

changing its treaunettl of :t lll'll tpts in a way th�H is

condn c ive

w t:'fficiency. As.sttntc that iJO% of

tht crirnin<Jls who !>t;tn w tnm n t t t

:t

sanc tion or ten year... in prison.

L ' t rdt·r the lit-:;t scheme, both those who rPmmit complett'

crime complete the crime succt'sstitlly. .�untt: that

I 0%

of

all crintit tab an· dettcted and 'ttt'<'t'""fully convicted. There are t\,·o ways w illlpttst: an expected

crimes and those who lailerl l<• t n rnplt:tt: them receive ten years in prison. Unclet the second
scheme. tlto�e whu attt' tn p t to

rc nt l l ni t ..t

crime recei,·c ftvt- yc::ar· while those \vhu complett'd the

crime receive ftftet:'n yt:.trs. f11 huth ,themes. the cl'i m i n al faces a sanction of th(· '<Ime e xpected
value (ten rears ) . The dt·sn .thiln� ul

each

one <>f these schemes depends . hc Mt>ver.

(H1

the

anitude of' the crimin;1b t< • Lllll t·n.ti r tl\. I r crim i nals are risk-averse. tht' St'C<>ttd �c hc.: mc \viii likdv
be more t::l'f't'cti\'t' than tht: fi r"t.

73.
Set gl'lwmlly Hard & 'iq(<ti. '11/'m nott' 8. q: United Sratcs v. Feola. ·1'20 U.S. 671, 69-l
��:·, (holding that Ollt' C<tll 'iol.ttt' ,1 'l<llllle criminalit.ing a.ssaull.'\ on fC'dt:ral ofllct't,., t'Vt:n if one

does not know that tht: ,·ic tin t i,., ,1 p<•lice officer); MODEL PE:-o;:\L. Coor.

::;

'2.0'2

( I �ti'l)

(srnting

that the:: men� rea rc::qnirttncnt,., ,tpph· only tO the material elementS of a tritnt:).
74.

See !'\eal Kumat IZ.tf'<tl.

(;,,,,1/Jirary Theo1y,

l t 2 YALE LJ. 1�07, 1363-6·1 (2003) (using

the dett'rn:m effect of tlllC't'l t<tll\1\ ,1, a ju�tiftcaLion fnr the Pinknton rule}.
1:1.

Tht: case of tltc

l'111krrtoJI

111le is e,·en more diswrbing in that tlte !'ate of Ollt' offender·

i:-. at th<.: h;lllcb nl othl·r�. \\ ,. rtta\

he willing tO tolerate smne citTtllll�tann:s in which
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The abil ity of law <�nl orcc:-m e n t

agencies

to

manipulate the cenainty o f t h e probability o f d{'tenion vat-ies according to
context. One arena i n which it seems quite po sibk is taxpayer compliance.
Tax

law enforcement is based

largely on

i nvt:stigating a representarive

sample of potential offe nders. The more thC' criteria for auditing and t h e
si7.e of the sample a r e publicized, the more cena i 1 1 the:- detection rate. Prior
behavioral decision research on taxpayer complia11ce suggest. that, provided
d1at sufficiem taxes have been withl1eld from wagt::s. reducing the certainty
ii
of the probabi lity of detection ,..,,oulcl increase' taxp<l\t'r (ompliance. l
Enfo rcement of parking laws (or perhaps o t h e r traffic violations)

is

another arena i n which cena.inty could be affecr cd �imila d,·. Many citizens
are exposed on a daily basis to the enforcement of traffic and parking laws
and can dewlop expertise with respect to their enrorcemc- n t . For example, a
municipality could

decide

to

send

parking

inspectors

rq,rularly

to

all

neighborhoods o r i t could decide to concentrate its efforts o n differenL
neighborhood.

on different, t·andomly seknt·d chH·s. The Iauer system

creates greatt>r uncertainty with respect w t h e probabi l i r; of detection. A
parking enforcement agency could change the cenaintv of detection b�·
announci11g (and then following through on the C\llnounc<:ment) that it was
going to adopt a less (or more) predictable parking ticket enfotTeme n t
pattern.
CenaiJHY can also be manipulated in other areas t h rough tht> use of
enforcement campaigns. In an enfor-cement ca m pa i gn , a Jaw enfot-cem e n t
agency targL'lS i t s resourct>s in a specific grog ra ph i c area o r on a speci fic type

of offen�e.

If increasing u n certainty

i ncrease�

de-terrence,

a

policy

of

t>nfurcement campaigns would produce great<"r deterrence than a policy
that allocated a constant stream of resourct's to {:nforct' mt' t l t by geographic
;'
area or type of offense.
An enforcemt>nt campaign increase. t h e
uncerta i nty of t h e probability o f detection b�

publicizing the fac t

that,

sometimes, the probability of detection will be wry high. AJthough the

rontingt•nriv, a�t· b<·vond 1he pow.:r of nflenc.ler� and ,.,.1 "·�i:-:1 rir( 111l1SI.inre� in wilirh 1llt'�t'
conting.:nrit·� art> r"mrolkd b,· o1her ag-eIll"·
76.
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public pn:sunntbly i . aware rhat Ia\\· e- n forcement officials cannot consisle>nr l�'
!ll<lilltain a high probabilit) of deteCLion i n e\·ery time a11d place, the facr
that ·ometi me<; the probability will be \'er;· high means that there i · a \vider
range of potential probabi lities of detection in any particular t i m e and
[-)lace.

Thus.

enforcement

campaigns

have

the

potential

to

deterrence. given fixed resource , not onlv by publicizing the

increase

fact

or Ia\.,.

enforcement activity ( tl1ll: recruitillg liH.: "availability heuristic" lO ·uppon
Ia\\· e::: n forcement effons) ;,; but also by i n creasing the uncertainry regarding
1 h e probabilirv of detenion.

Ton law also d i fferentiates between the treatment of uncenainrv \vith
respect to the

anction on the one hand and uncertainry with re pen lO the

probability of detection on the other. Uncertainty with re:-gard w sanction is
addressed direcrly by the law of tort damages and, i n d i rectly, by liability
insurance.

,1\Jthough

tort

law's

compensatory

purpose

i n troduce

an

i n escapable elcmem of uncertainty i n t o t h e expected value o f wn sanctions,
liability

insurance

substamially

reduces

that

uncenainty.

[n

contrast,

u n cenainl) wi1h r<"g���-d ro detection is nor addressed ar all.
l.
ln

L' ncenaimy Regarding Sanction i n Ton Law

tort law, que tions of sanction are addressed under the general

heading of ··ctamage .'' At the level of legal doctrine. tOrt law appears less
concerned \\'i t h reducing uncerta i n ty in sanction than criminal law. Thi
doctrinal difference follows from the compensation and victi m-cemered
focus of wn damages (as opposed to criminal sanctions) . Because of the
focus on the harm w the victim, i t is often quite difficult for a potential
tortfeasor to kilO\\' in ach-ance the amoum of damages that would be assessed
in the evem o f detection. O n e dramatic example of this is t h e "eggshell
skull''

rule,

pursuant to which

the

defendant

is

responsible

even for

unforeseeable harm to a foreseeable victirn .;9 A second dramatic example
comes frorn the liability provi ions of the

tatutory lOrt created b)' the

Comprehensive Environmemal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLr-\).'�11 Pu rsuant to CERCLA, a person who shipped only a small
amount of hat.ardous 1vasre to a site can be jointly and severally liable for the
clean-up of the e l l l i re site, even i f the person _reasonably believed that the
waste \vas not hat.arcluus.�q

78.

SerJolb l"l .11.. 'up1n note

80.

42 U.S.C.

Rl

!d.

79.

69.

St'l' gl'lu•rally B<:nn ' · Thomas, 5 1 2 N.W.2d 537 (Imva 1994) (discuss1ng lhe "eggshell
skull" rule uf ton ht"').

��

�l()(} l -9674

(20UO). We thank Kurt Strasst"t

�·nvironmental l.t'' i•nplit;llllHls or 0ur re earch.
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doctrinal d i ffe rence berwet'n ron and criminal

o;anctions ordinarily are much more c�nain

than

criminal sancti ons-at least from the perspective of the defendant-because
of liability insurance. If liability insurance is available. ir near!�· eliminates
uncertainty in
defendant.

ton sanctions from

Providecl

that

he

the

or she

perspective of an

has

insured

purchas�d adequate

tort

liabiliry

insurance, the cost w the defendant of a ton judgment will alway

be

approximately the same: t h e opportunity costs of the time pent c:ooperating
s2
in the defense. along with the associated aggravation and inconvenience.
Of course, liability insurance does not entirely eliminate uncertainty from
the defendant's per pective. There are other costs to bt-ing a ton defendanr,
and it is always possible that r h e insurance company will partially recoup the
damages paid in the form of higher premiums in the furure.

ev�nheless, i n

practice, liability insurance very substantially reduces uncertainty regarding
sanctions, at least from the perspective of potential tort defendant .
ln addition to tht> uncertain ty-reducing effecr of liability i n trrance,
there are also aspects of ron docu·ine that reduce the uncertainty of tort law
remedies. For example, in tort law there is an implicir, but ,·ery strong.
relationship between

rhe

oqjective

measurability

of' categories

of tort

damages and r h e degree of difficulty in obtaining those dam ages. The
easiest

elements

of a

ton

damages

case

are

rhe

out-of-pocket

losses

(sometimes called economic losses), such as medical expenses and lost
wages. The caregories of damages that are more difficult to calculate,

uch as

pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. are more difficult to collect.
Indeed. tort Jaw only grudgingly permitted such "non-economic" damages,
and their continued availability i

under constant thr<"at from ron reform

efforts to place caps on non-economic damages.

82.
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Liabi li ty insuranrt' typically covers the costs of defense a� '''ell a!>

'enlcrnetll or
juri�dirtion�. John B. Canatal!'a . .Jr ..
( unpublishnl I.Livl. lht·M�, L:niwr:.it\' ot

judgmc:>nt . En:n pu niti \t: damages an: insurable in many

Offo;horl"

lns uranrt' for Puniti,·e Damages 10 (2002)

ConneCticut School tJf 1."'') (<>Jt llle '''ith lhe JO\,'rt I..a"' Revie'' ) 1 "Currl'nth t\,·cnC\-Se\'en state�
pennit rm·cragc. in one way or anmher. for punith·c damage:..-) . .�t·t·

&consufl'ring ln�uranrr Jnr Punitivr

Damages, 199R

punithe damages ar(' not insurabk. a puniti,·e

pranire re duce!'

tlw u ncenai n t)'

f(•r punith·e damagt-.s. SI'I• Tom

Punitil'l' /)(lmrtge.s,

Wrs.

J..

d<tmagcs

J;I'IU'I'IIIIy Tom Baket,
R.l:\. 1 0 1 . In jnrisclirtic >n:. in ,,•hirh
ca
_ e

is mon· l ikch

Bak�'r.

l9�1R \\'!'). l.. RE\',

Trausjormi11g

21 I,

Pu11iJinnmt into ComjJt'lllfltion

2 1 1 . It is ,,·onh nming th<lt l <l l'g<'

St>Hle

Thi�

/11

tht• Shrufou• nj

corpuralions <1re ablt"

to p111-cha.�i" insuranC<' products that cow•1 punitin· damages asses�Nl c-,·,·n

,,·hich

to

that is otherwise created by the publi< policy against insuranct>

in j�trisdinions in
111/Hn• .11 28--14

�u('h damage� Mt' , .t.� a lonna] ma ner. not insurablt>. Se1 C :Mtalalsa.

(discus,ing

"off:�hnr<'

'''�'"paround"

insurance

p11lines).

En·n

if tht'

ctef('ndant

has

not

pu rch a!>cd adequaw i nsuranc �"· the chances t hat the deft.>ndatll ,,.,u lw rt>qu i red to pa' a m
hi!> o r h<'r 0\\11 pocket 111 <�n ordinan t wgl ige n n·

ton ca,,.. .tJc· 'mall .'iei' Tom Baker.
thf' ,\-Joml Eronom.' of Tmt l.nw 111 .-\rt1o11. 3:-l Lo\\\ & <.;or ·, Rf\. 275.
277 (20(1 ] ) fhert'inaJ'tt-r Baket·. 13/ood .\IIIII")'I.
H:�.
�·n· \o\', K
ip \'iM "'i & Patnri.< 13orn . .\JI'fliwl .\ loljn'nlllll' 111\1/lflllf'l' 111 ffl,. \ \ 'nkt• rJj l.mllllitr
mone�

from

Blood ,\/Qm;. . .\'n•• .\/rill") flllrf

H,•jorm. �-1.) I . H . \I '-;ll l 1 .J.f1:�. ·1 H-1 I I !19:1 )

1 2004 1

-17(")

P t l ni t i\ C ' d a m ctges are pe rh a p.;; t h e nwsL Uttcerrain of <til da1n ag-e-s. c;i net:
1 heY

rwt

an:

nece<;sarih

riecl

l0

th<' amount

of hann

i n flicted on

anv

p<u:r ir u lar p l ai n ti ff".s 1 For tlti reaso n ( a m o ng others), pun i tive dam ages are a
ve q' comroH·rsial leature of l'.S. LOrt law .

s;

Feat ures o f LOrt law thar reduce

the uncenaillt\ r('garding puni ti\'e ciama ges i nc l ude frequent decisions by
t rial courts to remit ( i.e . , reduce)

th e amounL of p u n i t ive dam ages .

ln

addi t i o n , t h e propensity for appel late courts to carefully scrut i n i ze and with
some � requcnc' reverse p u n i ti ve d ama?:es judgn1ents encou 1·ages l i tigants to

e n l t> p u n i t i \'C: damage case · bt>tween trial court and a ppeal .'"'

:-;

·

2.

Unn·-rmimy Regarding the Probabi li ty of Detec t io n in Ton Law

Otmide o f c ou rt. , ton law does not d i rec dy

Cldd re ss unce r tainty with

regard to cl e tec r i on . With t he li m i tecl except ion of s tat u to r)' torts, there are
no p ublic age nc i es cha rged with detecting ton law violations (except to the
exrenc that turt law ove rlaps with criminal law). Where such public agencies

cxi t. it is o ur i m (.>ressi o n that, l i ke crirninal jusLice institution , their focus is
on

rhe

( i ncrea ·ing)

probabi l i ty

p robabi l i ty of detection.

clete ct ion .lli

of

An

addi ti o n al

uncertainrv of d e tectio n i n tort law a

not

factor

the

ce rtai n ty of t h e

compounding

t he

compan·d to criminal lav.r is that, i n

comrast w cri r n i nal law, '·auempts" are n o t actionable i n tort. A breach of
the rel evan t lOrt law st a ndard is grounds for legal action only if that breach
cause:-. hann. I n many. perhaps mos t. cases of n eg l igence (or other civil
wrong" ) , llwre is at least so m e pro babi li ty that the breach will not ca use any
ha rm . and ir ;;eents q ui te l i kely that this probability will be uncertain.

3.
To

ct

Manipulating U nce r ta i nty i 1 1 Ton Law

d e gree . the com pensation goal of tort law l i m i ts the a bi l i ty to

mani pu late Llw

e nai n ty with re pec t to tht> . ize of the anction. On Lhe one

c

ha n d , t h e C 01 n pe 1 1 sati o n goal p re ven ts sanctio11s front be ing certain, b e ca use
ton da m ages d epend o n c o mi n gent faCLors. s uch as Lhe characteristics of the
,·inim and the nature o f the harm cau ·eel by t he wrongful behavior. On the

other hand, r h e com pensat ion goal p revents sanctions from being radically
uncertain. once again because the amount of ton da mages d e pends on the
harm.

H·L

fhl'l't' 1'

;1

lin·ly clcl:>att: about the untt:rUJilll\' <of pu1111 1\'C damage�.

Set' gl'nemlly
al., jurie1. jtulgps and Pun ithw IJtwutg''' · I 11 L-:mfliriral Study. 87 CORNELL l . .
RE\. 7-t:� (�WO�); -\. �!itchell Polinsky. Art' Punitwl' Oamng,., l?l'alfy hnignifimnt. Predictable, and
f<tr/rtottd? , I (.nlf/1111'111 1111 Hill'nherg el al., !l6 J. Lt::C·\1. S'f L D. ()()� I 1997).
Sl'i'. P._!!. . 1Ufnn IIOte 2 ( .
K:i.
k!i
')1'1' i\lk hat•l J Rustad. L'nmvl'llutg J>unttiTif' /Jrunagl'': C:un·mt Ott/a and Fwtht.
r lnquh)·.
I��::< \•\ IS. 1.. R!· \ . 1 :i. 1•1 { 199H).

Tht'odo�t· C:i�t'll bt·rg- t-L

.

:->7.

.

.

Exarnpl<-·-. c.l �ucl1 agem:ics in tht: United St,ll(.'� incl11clt· ('(HlSumer prorcction divisions

ot '\Lalt < .H tnn I('\' ){l'lH-1'<\ls. tht· Federal Tradt: Com 11 1i:;�itlll. 1ht· l-:11\'i rolllllt:ll tal ProLt::ct inn
\g-t'lH'\', ,111cl 1 111' Fn( ld .rnd Dru� :\dmini�tration.
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Yet, despite these l i m i tat io ns there are numerous ways by

,,·hich

nne can

man ipulate certainty in ron damages. One obvious mechanism is pun i ti ve
damages. In gene ral, p u n i t ive damage

ar<" i m posed tO punish <kfendants.

not to compensate victims, so there is no theoretical reason why p u n i t iv<"

�

damages need bear any particular relationship to compensatory damages . :;
Another

obvious

mechanism

is

liability

i n surance.

vVhen

liability

inslll·ance is less available, ton sanctions are more uncerrain. For example, a
lack of i n surance for pu n i t ive damages i n some jurisdictions makes the
:-;9
prac(ical impact of puni tive damages more uncertain. Similarly, the relative
lack

of

insurance

environmental

for

liability

envit·onmental
more

\111
uncenain.

harm
ln

makes

the

addition,

the

impacr

of

i ncreasing!;·

common practice of excluding coverage for claims relating to ··criminal acts "
turns insurance companies i n t o criminal law enforcement agencies of a sort,
and at the same time makes ton sanctions more uncertain in case · involving
u1
CJ·iminal norms.
Finallv, dos<'ly tying t h e future costs of liabilil:) insurance
to paid tort settlements or j ud gme n ts ( known as "expe1iencc ra ti n g" in the
insurance trade) would also i n c rease the uncertainty of torr damages.
Certain!:)' i n wn damage:-. may also be affected by rules regarding ton
damages. 1any ·' ton reform" <:'fforLs are aimed at reducing the 11ppe1· l i m i t
o f wn damages a n d . thus, may make ton damages more ce-rtain. Example
include restrictions on joi n t and scve,·al liability and caps on non-ero n o m i r
'':?
or puni tive damages
In addi t i on . the U . S . Supreme Court is dt·,·eloping
consLi(utional limits on pun i t ive damages t ha t l i m i t rhe j u ry's discretion
regarding the size of such a\\'ards.
of our research in

!l:l

One or the 1110St important implirations

tht> ton arena is (hat the r{'duction

unc ert a i n !\

i11

res11lting from t hese ton rc·lim11s may well magnify the ex pt·cted loss i n
deterrence resulting from tht· d ec l in e in

HR.

Cf.

the

amount o f damage. .

State: Fan11 t\hu. Aut•>. In�. Co. ' · C :amplwll, :\48 L'. ·. ..JO�. 1 2:� S. C1. J :d :'. J :-d!l-2!

(200�) (s<;Jiing 1h;11 du<· pro< t'�' ' on�kkr.uion� mancla<t' rhat punitin� d,nn.t).{t'" nn<�l bt'.tr a
n·asonable 1 dalionship 10 rompc·n:.,uorv dalll;.!!{t'.

Punitivr Damaf!"('.�: All fwnomit :\1/II�Hi\. I l l

cJ am::tge� should

1w b:hcd

on

t
.

H.-\R\'.

):

.-\. tvl itdwll Polin"b �- Stt·\"1:'1 1 Sh.ndl.

1 .. RE\ . Rli9. �NO

( 1 9�X)

(arguinR rha1 pn11ill\t'

fo1 lll lll<� that rakt'' into .1r<nu111 rom JWilsaron cl.un.tgt·, and rlw

1ikt-lihoocl or unckr-enforrt'lllt'lll ).

H9

St•r .\llfm' nole f\2 and .I( f<>lll J Jitll\111� lt.."\ 1 .

91

:-;,,,. T0\1

!Hl.

...,,, KF::>:;,.f.TJ ( AI\R_·�I I ·\\1. t.\;\ IRO:>::I.I(:'\ I'·\ I l .lAIIIUTY h.:-.I ·RA:-.< .F L·\\\ 1 'lX-:.'11�

I

1 �'' " )

8·\KF.R, ]'i..,l R \ :'\ n ] A\\' -\.''.:tl POl iCY 'itl:$-0:1 (�OIU) { c l hnh-,111)4 l i lt· t i�t· ol

<'I i111i n al t•xdu�ion� in 111�11r;11H

t• IH •Iirk:-): \l't'

n/\1/ .)t•ll::l lhall Simon. Co\t' l l llllg I hfl 111�h < :nnl<'

1 91i:>-2000, a1 7-:�7 ( u npub1 isl wd m::I<HN'I i ] l l . on li1t' Willi thi· lnwa l ..1w Rt'\tl"\\ ) .
!12.

Bl:'<'<lll�l· of li:thilil) iJhlll.lllt •·. i1 i � ditlirnlt t o kno"· 110\\' d w

,,.,t

i lt i ng

clc·n •··'"' 111

lllll'l'rtaint' alh··< 1:- po1t'n1ial toll dc·lc-lld;utls. Prior l't'�t<<1n h Sllgg"t·'SI� 111.11 llll'l J d < Jil11 d i < H " r) . ,

n n 1 llt'Ct'�'arih 1 c d 1 H e liabllit' in�tnann· ralt'S.

">

11 b p<l"''hh- t h a i 1nn �t>l11nn c J . ,,., 1101 111 l.1e1

dt'Ci t'a�t' IIIII t•J'l;illll\ lcll ltll'l dr-lt'Hci;tltl'. St'l' \'iq \bl & Burn. \lljlln 11<>11' s:�. .II
1h:u

m.tlpra• l i e t·

rdnrm

illn t':l�t·cl

insnrr'l

prnli1:1bi111'

h111

pn·micnn�)
!l'\

s,.,. <..;rate F.II'Ill \ t u r . \ tllo l n,. < :o \ . ( .;tm plwiJ. :",-l:-\ l ' S

cluJ

11111

tf iX \ �flll'>. l .

lfi:�-�1 1 1 ( l i l l t l l l l �

� e ·dllct'

in.<tll:llltc·

-t/X

I �00<-1 1
;\ lanipulating t t n cenain t\' i n dctt>c r i o l t is lt>ss straig-htfon�·ard in the LOt'!

.t rc n a 1 hc1. 1 1 in criminal justice because

of

L he imponancc of

..private" l<t\'

enforct'mem in torts and the lesser role of public agencie ·. To the t'xtent
that public agencies are charged with enforcing LOrt and related statulon
nurrns. these agencies should be able to use all of the technique
in

the

niminal

comext above.

For example,

an

addressed

agen.cy charged

\vith

inuea:;ing patient safety in hospitals could conduct random, highly intensive
audits of patient records to identifv adverse events, many of which would be
u n l i ke!\· ro ever ··esult in a pt-ivate rorr acrion becau e of historically verv lo,,•
!' '
claiming rates i n t h e medical malpractice arena. · With regard to classic ron
claims brought by individual plainr if(<;, however, there appears to be little
that can be done, directly. to maniput;ue the certainty of detection. Eve t t
with concerted efforts by members of the personal injury bar, intensive
shon-term

"enforcement

campaigns"

seem

u n l i kely

to

be

effective

in

increa ing the uncertainty o f detection.
On the other hand, publicity highlighting the ·'tottery" or "random"
nature of tort enforcemem may increase the deterrent effects of tort law i n
fields i n which the actual probability or detection i s quite small. Medical
malpractice may be one such example. Despite the facL<; that ( l ) a very small
!l:
percen tage of adverse medical events result in a medical malpractice claim. .
!lfi
( 2 ) doctors prevail in the majority of cases that actually go to trial,
(3)
Yi
rnedical malpractice insurance is not experience-rated,
and (4) doctors
9x
almost never have to pay money out of their own pockets,
the threat of
malpractice liability allegedly produce a great deal of "defensi\·e medicine,''
in which doctors perform additional te ·rs and take other precautions to

.'in· PACL WEILER ET AL., A y(EJ\Sl RF ()� M.\LPKACTICE: MEDICAL !�jURY, MAl.l'RACfiCI::
AND PATIE �T COMPE;-.iSATIO� 12:1-�ti ( 1993):

�H.

Ll I lt.XfiO�.

:VIalpractice law �eems

to

function in a manner akin to income tax audits. Only a

�mall fraction of potemiali)' �alid malpra< ticc claims ever ripen imo la"·suit'>.
HOI-'ever, clocwrs' inflated perceptions of the prospect of suit greatly magnify the

deteiTent leverage that litigation can exert over medical malpractice, at lt:ast by
comparison with what would be expened h ()Ill

a

simple calculation of the true

statistical risk of suit.

SI'P also Locatio
l'E\\'

E�C. J.

et

al.,

Relatinn Between i\lalpractt(t' Uazms and Adverse events Due UJ .VI'gligence. 325
( 1991 ) ( rcponi ng th.H frwer than two percent of negl igcn rlv i1�un:d

MED. 245, 247

patients pursue litigation).

\l:'l.
�)6.

See \>\.EILER

ET AL.,

supra note 94, at fil-·m

See PATR ICIA M. DANZON, Mt:.OI C.·\ 1 . �IALI'R.·\r.TICF.: THEORY, [\1DE�CE, -\�0 Pt:BLI<:

I'Ol.ICY 38 ( 1985) (reponing that ..plaimiffs 1,·uu in only cwenr.y-eight percent" of medical
malpractice cases rried to verdict).

97.

St'e Frank A. Sloan,

Experience Ra1111g. Uti•'' 11 Makl' Sensefor Medzral fvlalpractia Jnsumnce?,

-\\I. Ec:o�. RE\'.. Mar 1990. at 128. Experienct· r.uing is the practice of basing fuwre preminms
in pan on the claims history of individual in::.ur..-cl.;.

�IX.

See Baker.

Blood Monry. sujJm note R::!. m

'177.
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create a favorable record in the- event of a l awsu il .�1 Thus, the medical
malp rac t ice are n a suggests that u ncntai nty can be a "force multi pl i e r" and
therefore

a

ituations

potemially

in

useful

tOol

in

deterring

harm, particularly i n

to i n crease significantly the average

which i t i s difficult

probability of detection.
Environmental

enforcement a lso exploits the deterrent effects of

uncertainty, though with exactly the opposite combination of cer·taimy and
un c ertai n ty in sanctioning and dett'ction.

Because of the extensive record

keeping and m an i fest system impnsl"d b

the Resource Conse1vation and

Recovery Act

source.

wu

( RCRA), hazar·dou

wasres are easily tr·aced back to their

lf we think of produci ng the ha7.ardous waste as the ·'wrong, " then

t h e detection of that wrong is virntally cenai n for b usin esses that operate
1
\·v i t h i n rhe law.111 'What is radi cally uncertain, however, is the san c t ion for
1 h a t wro n g. The sa nc tion could bt> as small as the addi tional costs of usi ng
EPA-approved disposal service)), or as great as the costs of cleaning up a
f uture waste si re using a very expensivt", not-yet-discovered tec h n ol og . w:z
y

C
From

this brief ana lysis Wt"

Sl ',\JMAIH'
reach

the following conclusions.

First,

criminal law has a strong, well-esrablished aspi rati o n, embedded in d o cr ri ne.

that sanctions should be known in advance. A similar, although perh aps l ess
strongl y held, asp ira t ion can also bt> round in tort lav.-.
Second, despite this aspiration for

c err ai nr

y in sanctioning, th ere are

ways to manipulate uncertainty. For example. i n Clirninal law-the legal field
in \vhich certainty may be most rlwrished-certainL)1 in

anctioning could be

manipul a ted by rejeCL i n g the sen u.: n ci n g guidel ines or by i mroduci ng a
la rge r range of pe rm issi bl e sanctions i n t h e exist i ng st>ntencing guid eli nes.
Al t erna tively , uncertainty could be c reated by reduci ng rhe penal ties for
attempted (but not completed) rri me , or by bo rrowin g from the victin'"l
centered approach or tort law and i nc reas i ng the p e nalti es for co mp l e ted
c1·imes that cause greater harms. l n addition, prosecutors could borrow
Rudolph Guliani " s semen(" ing lotlerv idea and apply it to decisions to cha rge

up or down, or w dec i si on
In

law, unce rtai nly cotdd be in creased tl1 rough efforts di rened at

ton

99.

.'in•

Patricia Danzon. l.wbif/1,

1-.1 o--:mucs � ��9
lOll.

llJl.

''"�"

(2000).

.'in· 42 l" .S.C. ::i� lilJ91 -t1�1!l�k

dol'"

tl

,\l,•rilcflf

Mofjn·nrllrf'.

111

I

HA!'DUOOK c H l-Ib\I Til

t :lOOt iJ .

lraJHl' the ro'\L' of ''ast•· dispo,:tl .1� a "sannum.'" \o\"l· do. howt'\t'J". Ill ordt>r to

tha i t lwrt> arc "real hk'" �uuatJon� 1ha1 arl' analogoJJ�

det,·nion •� C<'rtain hut dw �ann1o11

IS radit

alh unct>nain.

( :ER< :Lr\ impo�<·, joint ,ltld 't'\"t>r;ll JJabilily 011 grnenuor� ;mel

1\t•ll a� on nwnc>r"
<

for

O f nmrst'. RCRA dot� no1 �·xplu 1 1 h franw hatarrlou� w:-bt<' procluc1iun a' . 1 -wr•)ng'"

d<"lllonstr:.stt·

I 0�.

about \\'hat kinds of plea ba rgai ns to enterta i n .

.Cim ph .lnt't•

<11

ro tht' ca�.- 111 ,,·hich

tran�pon�rs of ,,.:l,ll'�. ,\�

'lit"' in 1\"llich ,,·a!lt.-� an· <kpnsitt'd. Sr••· 4� l' '-i.C. �� 9!illl-�l67·1

,,i t l t gn�t'rtlllh'!ll

d d , ·nst• ' " a CERCI .:\ .H lion

n·gul,11inn� n·g-:trding di�p'>�al of han1dous

/d. � \)ti07

1\.-I�IC'

(�000).

i' 11 • 11 a

[ �ll0-1 1
JTdJJcing th� d<unpening ellen of li<lbilit' i11surance or hv efforts din·ncd at
i n rrea ing r i l e significal lCt' of· th� it-s:- prcdictahlc aspc·cb of l<ll"l dalllages.
such as noJH.:conornic or punit iH' damages as wt'll as j o i n t and se,·eral
lial>ilir�.
vVhether in the end sllch ddibcrme artempts to manipulate uncenainry
ought w he encouraged in t i l e face of the aspinllion for ccnai n ry is of
course an irnponant questio11, one to whic:h
vVe

propose

more

modestly

rhar.

the

Wt'

do not propose· an <ll l<>wcr.

potential

deterrence

effects

of

t should he investigated and cort"'i clerecl-a process that does not
unccrrai n y
seem w have occurred in the COJltCXl of the heated debate in the 1 970s and
19ROs over . e n tencin.g guidelines or in the context of the contemporary
heated dehate concerning punitive damages.
Third. while crirni11al and

wrT law em body a stron g aspiration for

certain[)' i n sanctioning, they do not appear to have the same aspiration for
certainty regarding the probabi l i t y of detection. This absence is perhaps

stronger in wrt law than criminal law because ton law enforcement depends
to a greater extent on 1 h e decisions of uncoordinated private plaintiffs,
rarher than (at least potentially) coordinated government agencies.
Fou n h , given the lack of consistenl, principled objection to uncenaimy
in detection, delibcratelv manipulating that uncertainty ought tO be rnore
acceptable.

Thus,

if

uncertaintv

in

fact

promotes

deterrrnce.

the

indiffe rence of tort and criminal Ll\v w t h i s particular k i n d of uncertainty
may present an opportunity. Of course. there may be situations in which the
probability of deteCLion is al readr -;o uncenain that del iberate eflons LO
increase the uncertain y
t will have litrle or no effect. Nevenhelc s, it seems
likely that there are other sitmuions in which the probabi lity of detection is
not as uncertain

and,

therefore,

the

potential

benefits o f short term,

intensive enforcement campaigns should be considered. Bringing public
anention

to

campaigns,

the

relatively

while

duration, could

high

withholding

probabi lity
i n formation

of detection

during

about

location

have the effen of exj.>anding the

their

these
and

range of uncertainty

regarding the probability of detection.
Finally, this reference to puhlic attention has an additional imponanr
implication. Even if other co11sickrations such as fairness (for example, i n
the context o f t h e cenainry o f rhe criminal sanction) o r practical l i m i 1 s on
the ability of enforcement agencit:s w detect wrongdoing (in the romext of
the certai n ty with respect to the prohah i l i ty of detection) dictate legal rules
and institutional procedures. it is still the case that certainty or uncenainty
could be manipulated to enhance dererrence. This is because it i

not

certainty or uncertainty per se that produces the deterrent effecL<; of the
legal system , but rather belief.s concerning certainty or uncertainty. Thu:., by
highlighting existing uncen.ainry-producing aspects of the system

(which

presumably exist for practical or othe1- reasons and are not manufactu red in
order to increase deterrence). the legal system could enhance deterrence.
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For t>xample, if juries have discretion o,·er the size of punitive damages
because of a commitment to democrarjc ideals, emphasizing the resulling
nncenainty could appropriately and fairly be used to promote deterrence,
<:>ven if i t V<'Otdd be immoral to delibrrately introduce the same level of
unct>rlaint)' into p u n i ti,·e damages olely on deterrence grounds.

IV. O�] ECTIONS
There are at least

five significant objections to the suggestion that

certainty should be manipulated to in crease deteiTence:
certainty

is

immoral;

(2)

Manipulatjon

Manipulation of certainty is not effective;
inefficient

because

it

may

lead

to

of

(4)

(1)

Manipul.ation of

cerlainty

is

costly;

(�)

Manipulation of cerlainry is

over/under-deterrence;

and

(!'>)

.M anipulation of certainty ma)' have unpredictable consequences because
subpopulations differ in their aversion to risk. We address each in turn.

A.

MORAl. CONSllJERA "J'JONS

J t could be argued that manipulating certai !ll)', either w i L h respect to
the-

ize of t h e sanction or· with respect to the probability of detect i o n , is

inherently wrong. lL may be wrong because uncertainty i t elf is wrong or,
even if unce-rrainty is not inherently wrong, creating uncertainty deliberarely
in order to increase deterrence may be wrong. The relunanct> to manipulate
certainty fot· the sake of increasing deterrence may be fOtmdecl on one of
t\\'0 moral explanations. It may, for instance, rest on the i n t u i tion that such
an uncertain!)' involves differential tr<:>aunent or people who are similarly
m1
situated and therefore violates principles of eguality.
Alternatively, ir may
re t on the belief that the size of the sanction should reflect the degree of
wrong committed and, ronsequentJv. that pe-oplt> who commit the same
w1

Tlw. e two moraJ intuitions are
wrongs should be treated in the same '''ay.
11 "
distinct. 1 The first is grounded in t h e ideal of <�q uality, while t h e second is
grounded in retributivejustice.
These 1noral intuirions seem particularly compelling when incJi,iduals
'''ho committed an identical wrong unrlt>r idemical circumstances receive
cliffe-re•nt sanctions ba ed on a system deliberately smtctured to promote
uncertainty.

Ill:�.
hrin!-(

:1

These

i n tuitions

seem

less

\ompelling,

however,

1n

Oisp;tril\ in sentencnt� i;. oltcn CDtHicmtwrl a " � � "m;mif<",t lorm o l inj11stice. \\'hich m:nS<'tllt'llcing svstem IIH<l publi<

dist·t']>lllc·."

\�h,,·onh.

wfJm

nnlt'

2. <II 2:�<i. Ollwr�.

hm,·c·,·er. lwl ien· 1 l 1 a 1 disparilv in ,....-ntcncing < a11 lw . ius1 ified. .\1'1· 1'\0R\'AI. 1\1 ORRIS. MAD:-\t:SS ·\i\'1>

I I IF ( .�1�1 1:-.:\l LA\\ 1 79-80 (I��!-\�). For a di,cus,..l<>ll of 1lw imponanc<' of COthtdcring f:1inws"

and cquali11 111 1 riminal bw. ,...t' AInn Hard

\'.\1.1- LJ. :l07 C I !l9�).

I 04.

Thc- ptlnnplt- ol ··prop<" II• lllah1 1 :·
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c i rcumstance:-;

111

whit h tht· di.;; pariry i

a bvproduct of a legal systt'lll that

aurhorize · legal deci ion makers lO weigh numerous !-actor<:. and make a
on

decision

the

basis

of an

o\·erall judgment

of

the

culpabiliry

or

wrongfulness of rhe rele\·arn behavior. In other words, there seems to be a
substantial difference between (a) a sentence that ranges between five and
Len years determined by the nip of a dice; and (b) a sentence that range
between five and Len years according co the discretion of a judge.
AJthough both S)'Stems lead to uncertainty, the former system violates a
sen ·e of justice because it ic; de ignecl lO bring about uncertainty and
because i t also i n t roduces playfulness into the process in which people's fate
is

determined-a

proces

which

is

perceived

to

be

one

of

seriou

deliberation. The lattt'r system leads to uncertai n ty, but iL is not designed to
bring about disparicy in sanctioning; the disparity is simply an u n i ntentional
byproduct of a . c h e rn e designed to take seriously the particularities of each
case. These particularities are so complex

that they i nevitabl

lead to

uncertainty even if this disparity is grounded in relevant differences bet\veen
the different cases.
This raises the possibility that existing uncertainty, which is justified on
other ground , could be emphasized or publicized in order to i11crease
deterrence. without violating moral concerns about deliberately increasing
uncertainty. Some purists may resist this conclusion, however. arguing that,
although

certainty

brought

uncertainty may never be

about
used

to

u n i n tentionally
promote

may

deterrence.

be
ln

legitimate,
r h i · view.

uncertainty could be maintained without violating our sense ofjustice, only
if it is not intentionally used to promote deterrence, but is designed for
. .
]fl(;
otI 1 e r I egtumate purposes.
Thi

·

concern for cenaimy seems more compelling with re. peer to the

size of the criminal or civil sanction than i t is with respect to the probabiliry
of detection. Consequemly, even if one believes that a system which i m poses
uncertain sanctions is morally abhorrent, one can still approve of generating
uncertainty with respect to the probability of cletecrion for the

ake of

promoting deterrence.
Last, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that the ideal of equal sanctions
for equal wrongs is nol as entrenched as it may seem. lu his rnniculous
analysis of legal sanctions, Bentham has argued that: ''The last ol�ect [of

I Oo.

Admiuedl}'. however. [he Iauer system, in which unce rtai n ty is not

dt'�igned

to

c:-nh<tnce deterrence may have less dete rren t effects. This is beca use if the sanction depends on

the discretional)' powers of a judgt-. the oflcndcr may believe he can innuence the us�: of this

discretion. The proce.� set>ms It'� .t.rbi t rarv and thus more certain than the arhirrary toss of a

coi n . Arguahly. therefore. introducing arbitrariltt'ss in san cti on ing prest'nrs tht: polic· maker
�
with the following dilem ma: Eitht:r uncertainLy is introduced in a way which is hlatanilv unjus1
{such as by tossing a coi n ) , or i t is introduced in legi t imate ways which have k:-�Pr cktcrrent

ellecL� because they art' pc:-rcci\·ed
raising this point.

lO

be:- les� arbitrary. We arc grateful to Beth<�m· lkrg<:r for
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criminal law] is, whatever mischief is guarded against, to guard against it at
a cheap a rate as possible: therefore the punishment ought in no case to be
nwre than what is necessary r.o bring it intO conformity with the rules here
10;
I n contemporary literature, this principle has been labeled the

give n . "

principle of parsimony. The principle of parsimony often overrides the
1013
If, by manipulating certainty, the legal system can
principle of equality.
t-educe

the average size of the sanction.

principk

of

parsimony-a

central

it follows the dictates of the

principle

enu-enched

m

the

contemporary legal system.

B.

CosT

One could argue that the manipulation of certainty may have its own
costs. It is possible, for instance, that conducting enforcement campaigns is
more costly than maintaining a constant degree of enforcemenL If the costs
of manipulating certainty (eitJ1er incn�asing o r decreasing it) are high, these
costs may override the deterrence-based benefits of such a manipulation.
ome methods of m�nipulating cenainty could be costJy. Yet, other methods
are not. An examination of rhe overall cost

and benefits of manipulating

certainty can be made only after a more rhorough investigation of the effects
of uncenainty on deterrence.

This i

precisely what our expnimem is

designed tO do.

C.

EH-H.TII -r:s�::ss

I t may be argued that ccnainty with re. pect to the size> of d1e

anction

or with respect to the probabiliry of detection are such marginal factors i n
the decision t o violate a legal norm that policie

targeted at uncertainty will

not be effective. This i neffectivenes. objection may be based on an intui tive
sense that actors operate on the basis of the expected value of 1 heir action
and, thus, certainty plays little role in their calculations. This ol?jenion is
exactly what our expetiment is designed w test.
Alrernative.ly,

the

ineffecti\'eness

o�jection

may

be

based

on

the

conviction that the deteClion or criminal or tonious behavior is already so
highly uncertain that the effects of manipulating certainty furrht>r for the
ake or increasing deterrc:>11ce cfln at most be margi nal. This is perhaps the
most

powerful

objection

ro

the

analy is

providc.>d

in

this

Article.

Nevertheless, even wirb regard to case� in which detection is al ready
uncertain.

the analysis

is

thi

Anicle

·uggesL<;

that

there

ma�

be

so

law

enforct>ment benefits to b<" gained bv highlighting rhis uncertainty in or<in
ro

reap

its

deterrence

benefits.

Moreover,

rhere

undoubtedly

are

circumsll\llce>s in which tht> probability of <ietection at least appears If's ·

I 07. j ERF \I\ B� :" 1 1 1:\\1. !\'\ 1:--, I RODI . (
1 ()9 ( 1970).
s,,,, Mnn i,. 111jn11 1101•· :.:!:� 11 1?'\:l
10�
• .
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uncertain: such as violmiuns of parking r·t-gtdations. traffic oflen�e:-s. ta:-.:
crim<:-�. llccdth and safety regulations. and the like.
ol�jection. although ,·cry important, requires detailed

In 1 ht" end, thi

empirical research that is beyond the l i n ritt"d scope of our project. Whether
it is worth conducting that research turns. in

igniftcanr parr., o n whether

uucertaitlt\ can ha\'t' a deterrent effec t. For· that question our experimenr

.

.
provt<
. I es L I H' begtntHngs
o f' an answer.

10''

!t is �ometime-s argued thal. ir. sanction

are otherwise set optimal! .
1111
then uncertainty can cause irlefl-icient (}\'t"r-(otnpl iance.
rr uncertainty in
fact increases t h e deterrent eff'ecr..s of orne criminal or civil ·anctions. rlten
i ncrea. i ng uncertainty would increase the costs associated with comtnining
the crime or wrong.

Given

the

(heroic)

assu mption

that

a

particular

sanction i · othenvise set optimally, i ncreasing uncertainty would lead to
over-de terrence. On the other hand, \vith at least some combinations of
average si1.e o f sanction and average probabi lity of detection, increasing
uncenaint�'

beyond a

n:·rtain

point

may reduce deterrence

t h rough

a

re·punse that may be similar to that of "learned helplessness" ( t h e term i n
the psychological l i terature for t h e apathy that results when punishments do
111
not appear to be related to behavior) .
Thus, depending o n th<"
circumstances,

increasing

uncertainty

could

lead

to

over-

or

un<ier

deterrence.
While sig11ificant, these concerns do nor undercut our analysis. Incleecl.
they support o u r effort to investigate the deterrent effects of uncertainty. l f
uncertainty i n fan increases deterrence, r l r e 1 1 increasing uncertainty may be
a cost-effective way w increase deterrence in situations in which there is

w

reason

believe

the

ex,sung

level

of

detetTence

is

not

optimal.

Alternatively, i f existing sanction · are optimal, policymakers may be able to
reduce

the

costs of deterrence

by reducing the

average sanction

and

i n creasing uncertaint:y (leading to, for example, lower incarceration costs in
the criminal con[ext and

maller average punitive damages a...,,ards in the

civil con text).

l 09.

:\

tina!, less substamial. inetfectivcnc-�� o�jertion applies on!)'

to

repeat pi avers in

enf'orcerJWI1[ games. This objection a�sen.s thal increasing unce rtai nt Y in individual roun(b nf

the ga111t- ,,·ill nul change the behavior of pc::vple wltu p lav ofLen enough so

thac Lht·ir san<..Li l>�h

art: based PII the average probability of c lelect ion . lr t rue. this objection would dcmonstratl' dw
tlc::tern:llt p()wt:r of uuct:rtain ty, bt:cause Lhe rept"at players would be m aki ng decisions frun1 the

pcrspcniH· of ce rtaimy.

rathe•·

than

unrenai11rv.

en forccn wn t games arc liahilit} insurance comp:l ll ics.

I I0
I l l.

.),.,.Calfee & C:raswell,

supm tautt: I 6. ar

quimessential

repeal

plaH:r�

i11

9(i5.

St•P LEKORE £. WALKER, TilE 13A ITI:.R£D \\'0\I.\N SY:'-/DROMF. 1 0 - 1 1 (2d eel. 2000) (11:>111g

the concept ot learned helplessness
Marnn Se ligma n

( l �lil'i ) .

The:-

el

a!..

w

explai n the:: banerecl woman svndrome). Sn• ,!!.'I'IIPmllv
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Polinsky and Sbavell have argued that over-deterrence is particularly
l i kely

to

result f1·om unccnaimy concerning the amount of th<" sanction

bt"ca11se of the risk bearing cost borne whe never the sanctjon is set higher
than

1 he

external costs of the act.iviry rhat the sanction is i mended to
11�
The intuition here is that within the economic analysis of law.

discourage.

the optimal (objective) expected value of a sanction should be set so that i t
matches t h e external costs that t h e activity i mposes o n society. and that a t
an)' time a potential sanction i s higher than that amount, t h e people who
..
sl1ould'' engage i n that activity ( because their private gains from the activity
\_·xcced

external costs) will be subject to the 1isk that they will have to pay

the

a sanction that exceeds the optimal sanction. Because of risk aversion, the
risk of

a

larger sanction will lead individuals to assign a subjecti\·e <"Xpected

\'alut" to the sanction that will exceed the objective expected value of that
At the margin, some people who "should" engage in the
.
activit:)' will not, and all people who do engage in the activity will bear a
same- sanction

higher risk than they "should."

For this reason, Poli nsky and Shavell

conclude that, subject to the cosL'i of enforcement, it is mor(' t"fficient Lo
increase detCJTellCC by i ncreasing the probabi J i !:)1 Of detection than by
.
.
.mcreas1ng
.
1 IH� s1ze
o f tI1e sanct1on. , , .�
Although this concern is also significant, it doe

not undercm our

analysis . I nstead, i t suggests that in some circumstances there art' comp<."Ling
considerations in favor of reducing certain kinds of uncertainry. Moreover,
'"� t h i n their theoretical framework our analysis adds an additional tool to
i J tcrea::.e deterrenct' that can be traded off again t sanction size. namely
.
.
1 14
d mg
.
· of detecuon.
tI1e pro 1JaIJl· 1 ny
t1ncena111ty regar.

The final ol�jection

is one that

is not

in

fact

addressed by our

L'xperiment. This is the objection that i ncreasing uncertainty may ha\'e
nnpredictable results due to systematic variaLions in the risk aversion of
subpopulations. For exampk. there is res<"arch that suggests that p<·ople in
ignificantly less risk-av<:-rse nn a\·erage-and mort' likely to be

prisons are

risk-seeking-rhan

sntclt'nLs ,,·ho t) pically participate i n
'"
bl'havioral decision research experiments.
Thus. i f w e wall! to deter at

I I �.
I I�

l tigh c:t
1

un dergracluatc

.'il'l' Polin�\..� & Sh,l\dl. .111jno tto1�· :i, ,11 :-il·HJ-� 1 .

!d. ,u RXI. HX-1-H:•;

line:

111:\\' ltll\'t'l

Jt't' it/. .11 x:·
q

tni l it)

lt'xpbitllttg 1h.11 "Lh�· 11:-t· t1l ,t �111alk1 prob,tiHlir' and

untt'"lling p.tniripatJtln 1 11 llw ·" li\tt\ - ,

I l -l.

T<J th<' t' X l c nt

1ha1

:1

dtw 1 1 1 n�k be:.�ring .tnd mort· t h ,\11 ulht•t tlw bcndit.' from

tllH •·n.tilll\

d�·ic:rrt·n• �· . in< rt'a�i ng th:ll unreruinn

"'

�t•g;tdfinf.:

tilt' ,i1.c

ol

:1 "attCIHIIl .tl,.,

i111 n·.tst·,

t�dd in t •·eaw ri�k-b�·aring ('t;,.,IS in 111111 h tlw sanw

manm·1 al. inrn.·:.��ing ilw ,;tnnion sit . .. ') ftu,. "trading" incrt>:tsl·d nnn.-naint' rq.:an l in g tht· sizc

nl Lht:' sanruon

lot

1 (·dun•d

;nt:"rag•· "
:Inc thlll ,jl.l' \Hiltlei IIlli den c:.tst' till" risk bearing t'<>'l with
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least some !<._incl. of serio11.S criminal acti' i tv, increasing uncerrainty might be
coumer-producti,·e. Similarly, Lher<: i.

research

uggesting that the nw�t

safety-co nscious and law abiding people might also be the most ri

k-averse.

1 1"

As a result, increasing uncertainty could in SOITle circumstances have the
perverse result of over-deterring those who are already complying with legal
norms while increasing the under-deterrence problem among those who are
alreaclv more casual about complying with legal norms.
It is vety imponanr to note. however, that this objection can also be
rai ed

with

regard

w

efforts

to

increase

deterrence

u ing

the

more

traditional tools of sanction size and probability. Thus, this objection is not
unique to efforts to use uncertainty w increase deterrence. Accordingly,
although variations in aversion w uncertainty are importanr and worthy of
funher investigation, that investigation is worth pursuing only if one is lirst
persuaded of the potemial deterrent effects of uncertainty. That. of course,
was Lhe primary object of Lhis research .

CONCLUS£0t

V.

Traditionally. legal scholarship i n criminal law and i n ton law has
focused attention on the amount of and the procedure for determining
sanctions. Law and economics analysis expanded that traditional focus by
demonstrating the importance of considering the probabi lity of detection
and risk aversion. As that analysis has demonstrated, it is the

exfJPcled wnction

[hat matters, not the absolute size of the sanction. Indeed, higher sanctions
could in some circumstances lead to a lower probability of detection, with a
re ulting decrease i n deterrence, and vice versa.
Using the insights of behavioral decision research, this Article has
emphasized yet another factor that affectS the deterrence value of ci,·il ,tnd

criminals are ri sk-ave rse wi1.h regard

setllt:nci ng

increases

crime),

Ln

impri�onmenl and 1.ha1.. as a resull. detcrmincnc

available
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hnp:/ /papers.ssrn.com/soi�Vdclivery.cfm/

S R'<_l D37042 1_code03021 0500.pcll7abslractid=37042 l .
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criminal sannions. I t is not only the expected sanction that counts, but also
the certainty with which

that

expected sanction can

be known

in

the

individual case. Varying the certainty of the size o f t h e sanction o r of the
probability that it will be imposed also affects the deterrence value of thf'
sanctioning system .
T h e conclusions drawn from our research and analysis are l i kely to
depend,

at least in part, on

perspective. Staunch believers in law and

economics may conclude that legal thinkers should rethink their traditional
hostility tOwards uncertainty. Other legal scholars may conclude that this
Article provides yet another demonstrarjon that legal institutions do not rest
on economic rationales. Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion ro draw,
however, is that i n contexts that do not raise serious concerns of injustice
and

unfairness. uncertainty could

i ncrease

deteJTence

institutions.

without

indeed

compromising

be

manipulated

the

ideals

in

orde1· to

underlying

legal

